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Abstract
Framing cultural and demographic change as abrupt or continuous is theorized to respectively
worsen and reduce intergroup hostility (e.g., anti-immigrant policy endorsement, prejudice,
discrimination). Psychological anchors and propellors are theorized to respectively exacerbate
and lessen negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change. Two experiments applied
the Cultural Inertia Model to 1) identify methods through which majority groups attempt to
maintain the status quo as a function of demographic change (i.e., support toward right-wing
authoritarian leaders, collective action for White nationalism, and voting restrictions), 2) identify
who is more likely (i.e., high levels of national nostalgia) or less likely (i.e., high levels of
national prostalgia) to support those methods, 3) identify solutions for reducing those methods,
and 4) identify explanations (i.e., group status threat and violent radicalization) for those
relationships. The findings were mixed. The results demonstrated that those high in national
nostalgia who were presented with abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born
Latinos reported significantly higher ideological radicalization (Experiment 1) and support for
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (Experiment 1). Contrary to what was predicted, presenting
demographic change as continuous (Experiment 2) led to higher violent radicalization among
those high in national nostalgia. National prostalgia did not moderate any of the relationships.
Group status threat and violent radicalization did not mediate any of the predicted relationships.
National nostalgia and prostalgia predicted higher levels in the outcome variables via increases
in violent radicalization. Implications of the findings were discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“You end up having … change happening very rapidly, too rapidly for a big portion of the
population” – Barack Obama, October 25th, 2021
Around the world (e.g., the United States, Brazil, Europe), there has been a rise in rightwing authoritarian leaders in powerful political spaces. Many of these far-right demagogues go
into their respective professions with the goal of undermining democratic institutions and norms
(Diamond, 2021). Similarly, there have been multiple instances of collective action by White
nationalists. Their common objective: to unite against “outside” threats; Gamboa, 2019;
McEldowney, 2018; Robertson et al., 2018). These attempts to “restore” law and order are
broadly an attempt to maintain (or return to) the status quo. President Trump’s political slogan,
“Make America Great Again”, is one recent example in the US of political campaigns
intentionally attempting to revert back to the “good ol’ days” – a time where it was perceived
that American conservatism was not facing extinction (Kydd, 2021), and White individuals were
the clear majority group within the U.S (Cohn & Caumont, 2016; Zárate et al., 2019).
The perceived decline of White supremacy is a function of racial demographic change
(Zárate et al., 2019). By 2055 it is expected that the White population will become a minority
group within the US (if all racial/ethnic minorities are considered as one group; Cohn &
Caumont, 2016). These demographic shifts are theorized to incite a variety of negative and often
extreme and radical reactions (e.g., prejudice, outgroup derogation; Cohn & Caumont, 2016;
Zárate et al., 2004; Zárate et al., 2019). The literature on demographic change (i.e., changes to
the composition of a population) has generally focused on “what” is produced by change (e.g.,
mental health, social mobility; Chan et al., 2021; Infurna et al., 2021), and “why” change occurs
(e.g., increases in individualism, openness; Gotz et al., 2021; Kusano & Kemmelmeier, 2021).
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Although it is important for researchers to study the interpersonal and intergroup reactions and
explanations of demographic change, not much research has focused on the methods through
which majority groups actively attempt to maintain the status quo in the face of demographic
change (apart from policy endorsement).
Political campaigns, collective action, and voting practices are great generators of change
and/or stability. Thus, three ways in which groups can maintain the status quo is by supporting
right-wing authoritarian leaders, engaging in collective protest, and limiting voting rights. Given
the rise in right-wing authoritarian leaders, demonstrations of White nationalism, and policies
that make it more difficult to vote, as well as the simultaneously increasing diverse
demographics in the US and abroad, it is important to investigate how demographic shifts may
influence support for radical leaders, collective action, and voting right restrictions. Thus, this
paper investigates violent radicalization in authoritarian leadership support, collective action for
White nationalism, and support for voting right restrictions as a function of demographic change.
The research questions that were investigated are: 1) how does framing demographic change as
abrupt (produced by foreign-born or US-born Latinos) impact right-wing authoritarian leadership
support, collective action for White nationalism, and support for voting right restrictions? 2)
Does presenting demographic change as continuous reduce conservative reactions? 3) What
individual difference variables facilitate or reduce support toward right-wing authoritarian
leaders, collective action, and voting restrictions? And 4) What are potential explanations of the
effects?
THE CULTURAL INERTIA MODEL
The Cultural Inertia Model (CIM) provides an organizing theory to study reactions
toward societal shifts, including demographic change. The CIM has four tenets (in no particular
2

order) that are analogous to Newton’s laws of motion. First, the CIM argues that cultures at rest
(i.e., static cultures), desire to stay at rest. Thus, static cultures (i.e., environments where cultural
and demographic stability is generally the norm) are predicted to embrace cultural stability,
including demographic stability, and react negatively toward cultural and demographic change
(Zárate et al., 2019).
Research utilizing the CIM has primarily utilized samples from demographically static
cultures to test the CIM tenets, and population characteristics are generally used to label a group
or geographical location as static. According to the CIM, the Midwest in the US is an example of
a static culture (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2019). The Midwest in the US (e.g., Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Illinois, etc.) is primarily comprised of White conservative individuals (i.e.,
approximately 70% of residents in the Midwest identify as White and approximately 85% of
those White individuals identify as politically conservative). Those demographics have not
changed significantly in over a century (Pew Research Center, 2014). In 1890, most residents in
Iowa (83%; Durand, 1913a), Michigan (74%; Durand, 1913b), Indiana (91%; Durand, 1913c),
Illinois (76%; Durand, 1913d), and Kansas (89%; Durand, 1913e) identified as native-born
White. In 2021, most residents in Iowa (90%; United States Census Bureau, 2021c), Michigan
(79%; United States Census Bureau, 2021e), Indiana (85%; United States Census Bureau,
2021b), Illinois (77%; United States Census Bureau, 2021a), and Kansas (86%; United States
Census Bureau, 2021d) identified as White. The demographic census data between 1890 to 2021
corroborate the findings from the Pew Research Center (2014).
Cultural and demographic change/stability are distinct constructs and processes.
However, per the CIM, demographic stability over time suggests that there may also be relatively
little variation in local norms, cultural tapestries, and social interactions (Zárate et al., 2019).
3

Nevertheless, there are multiple examples showcasing that no culture is purely static. For
example, around the US, including in the US’s Midwest, individualism has increased
(Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Ogihara et al., 2015), conformity in the US has decreased (Bond
& Smith, 1996), narcissism among US college students has increased (Roberts & Helson, 1997;
Twenge & Foster, 2008), and support for gender equality has increased (Thornton, & YoungDeMarco, 2001).
Second, CIM argues that cultures in motion (i.e., dynamic cultures) desire to stay in
motion. Dynamic cultures (i.e., environments where cultural and demographic change is the
norm) are predicted to embrace cultural change, including demographic change, and reject
cultural and demographic stability. Third, the CIM argues that for every action, there is an
opposite reaction (this applies to both the first and second tenets). When changes are introduced
into static and dynamic environments that go against their existing norms, individuals who reside
in those environments fight back with the motive of maintaining their respective status quo. For
instance, Armenta and colleagues (2022) reported that White populations in the Midwest respond
with prejudice, threat, and outgroup derogation toward those who are believed to be enacting
demographic and cultural change. Other research utilizing the CIM found similar findings
(Zárate et al., 2012). Different laboratories have also found that the group prototype (i.e.,
qualities or characteristics presumed to be typically held by a group; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is
important for understanding reactions toward demographic change. For example, when
demographic change is made salient to Whites who equate American with White (i.e., the group
prototype), these individuals were more likely to support cultural assimilation than White
individuals who equate American with all racial/ethnic groups (Danbold and Huo, 2015).
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The CIM posits that dynamic and static cultures react negatively toward changes that
threaten their respective status quo because the change threatens their identity (Zárate et al.,
2012; 2019). In other words, the places people frequent, the individuals people engage with, and
the customs people follow all become integrated into the self-concept over time. When
demographic and cultural change occurs, those cultural objects, people, and spaces that have
become a part of one’s identity, are perceived to be at risk of being lost (Armenta et al., 2022;
Zárate et al., 2012; 2019).
In line with that hypothesis, social identity theory predicts that individuals and groups are
motivated to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and individuals maintain
a positive social identity via downward social comparisons. However, when individuals believe
that their group status is diminishing relative to other groups, groups experience group status
threat (i.e., one’s perceived group status or influence is threatened). Group status threat has been
linked to intergroup hostility (e.g., prejudice, discrimination, conservative political positions;
Blalock, 1967; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Craig & Richeson, 2014) and has been found to
explain the relationship between demographic change and intergroup hostility (Major et al.,
2016; Craig & Richeson, 2014).
A driving force of increased group status threat as a result of demographic change is the
perception that negative attitudes toward White individuals and positive attitudes toward
minority groups are increasing (Norton & Sommers, 2011). However, there is very little
evidence to support that belief. In fact, the opposite might be true. Whereas negative attitudes
toward White individuals have remained unchanged following the 2016 presidential US election,
there have been noticeable increases in negative attitudes toward minority groups (sexual
minorities, immigrants, etc.; Crandall et al., 2018).
5

Not everyone is expected to react negatively toward cultural and demographic change.
The psychology of this provides caveats or moderators. Thus, the fourth tenet of the CIM argues
that there are individual difference measures that exacerbate (i.e., psychological anchors) or
reduce (i.e., psychological propellors) negative reactions toward cultural and demographic
change (Zárate et al., 2019). Psychological anchors (i.e., individual difference variables that
increase one’s need for stability) and propellors (i.e., individual difference variables that
increases one’s need for change) will be further discussed below. Despite there being very
limited research on the second tenet of the CIM (Zárate et al., 2019), for the remainder of this
paper, the emphasis will be on static cultures and how they react in the face of demographic
change.
Types of Change
Unlike other research (e.g., Major et al., 2016; Craig & Richeson, 2014), the CIM argues
that types of cultural and demographic changes are significant for understanding reactions
toward those societal shifts. Past research, for example, demonstrates that presenting cultural and
demographic changes as abrupt (i.e., sudden, unexpected cultural and demographic changes)
produce more negative reactions (e.g., prejudice, anti-immigrant policy endorsements; Armenta
et al., 2022) in comparison to presenting the cultural and demographic landscape as stable. One
explanation is that abrupt cultural and demographic changes are perceived as more difficult to
adapt to because abrupt cultural and demographic changes risk a sudden and unexpected loss to
one’s identity. Supporting that explanation, collective identity continuity (i.e., the historical
representation of a group’s identity is like current representations of a group’s identity) predicts
higher support toward leaders who promote past and present collective identity (Syfers et al.,
2021).
6

If identity is important for understanding negative reactions toward perceived abrupt
demographic and cultural changes, then keeping one’s identity intact despite demographic and
cultural change occurring should reduce negative reactions produced by change. In line with that
hypothesis, presenting current cultural or demographic changes as continuous (i.e., changes that
are consistent with past patterns of cultural or demographic changes) has been found to be a
useful tool for reducing negative reactions toward societal shifts (i.e., reduces fear toward
immigrants, ingroup protection, and outgroup derogation; Armenta et al., 2022). However,
considering that conservatism is positively linked to intergroup hostility (Armenta et al., 2021;
Reyna et al., 2021), socially politically conservative individuals are predicted to react the most
negatively toward cultural and demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019), and research has yet to
control for political ideology in many of the aforementioned experiments (e.g., Armenta et al.,
2022), it remains unclear whether social political ideology is a driving force of the demographic
and cultural change effects. Thus, the current experiments control for social political ideology to
distinguish the effect of demographic change on the outcome variables from their common
association with social political ideology.
METHODS THROUGH WHICH MAJORITY GROUPS MAINTAIN THE STATUS
QUO
As the US and abroad become increasingly diverse, it is important to investigate how
demographic changes influence politics, especially right-wing authoritarian leadership support.
Research demonstrates that there is currently a democratic regression around the world,
including in the US. For the first time since the post-cold war era, countries with populations
over one million have enacted more right-wing authoritarian (i.e., an extreme inclination and
submission toward aggressive and conventional authority figures; Altemeyer, 1988) regimes in
7

comparison to past years (Diamond, 2021). Altemeyer (1988) argues that right-wing
authoritarians value social stability and prejudice toward dissimilar members. More recent
research on right-wing authoritarianism corroborates earlier findings of right-wing
authoritarianism by demonstrating that those who endorse right-wing authoritarianism are more
likely to support prejudice toward outgroup members (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), perceived
“dangerous groups” (e.g., gang members, drug dealers), dissident groups, (e.g., protestors,
atheists; Asbrock et al., 2010) and ethnic persecution of and aggression toward immigrants
(Thomsen et al., 2008). These findings are important given that the US has one of the highest
levels of right-wing authoritarianism compared to the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Spain,
Italy, Australia, and Canada (Venaglia & Maxwell, 2021).
Because cultural and demographic changes produce social instability and promote
multicultural practices (Zárate et al., 2019), opponents of change may turn to leaders who aim to
produce social stability such as right-wing authoritarian leaders (Major et al., 2016). Thus,
support for right-wing authoritarian leaders and regimes may be a function of perceived abrupt
demographic change. Research demonstrates that people become more conservative on a variety
of political issues such as anti-immigrant policy endorsement, housing issues, and diversity
initiatives as a function of cultural and/or demographic change (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et
al., 2012; Craig & Richeson, 2014). These effects are often mediated by group status threat
(Craig & Richeson, 2014; Major et al., 2016). For many White individuals, especially President
Donald Trump supporters (De Jonge, 2016), demographic shifts are viewed as “zero-sum”;
Racial/ethnic minorities are perceived to gain status at the expense of White individual’s group
status in society (Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014).
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Similarly, research regarding the 2016 presidential election demonstrates that “cultural
anxiety” (i.e., feelings of being a stranger in one’s own land and feeling like one needs protection
from foreign threats) produced by shifts to US demographics was one of the best predictors
(above and beyond economic anxiety) of support for Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential
election (Cox, 2017). Experimental studies support those findings. For example, Major and
colleagues (2016) found that if demographic changes (i.e., Whites in the US will become a
minority by 2042) are made salient to highly identifying White individuals, they are more likely
to support Donald Trump, and less likely to support political correctness and left-leaning
presidential candidates such as Bernie Sanders and Hillary Clinton in comparison to when
demographic changes are not made salient. Group status threat mediated those findings. Those
effects have yet to be tested within a CIM framework and solutions using the CIM have not been
proposed.
Collective action
Collective action is an additional method of facilitating cultural and demographic
stability or change. Collective action refers to behaviors that are perceived to improve the wellbeing/conditions of a group. When individuals believe that they are disadvantaged and their ingroup status is threatened or unstable, they fight to facilitate their well-being of their group
(Wright, 1997). Historically, collective action has been used by minority groups as a vehicle to
create a more sustainable and equitable world. Recently, however, there has been a significant
increase in public displays of collective action for the support of White nationalist beliefs. The
US Capitol riot is one example of a highly visible event showcasing support for far-right
extremist groups and ideologies (Kydd, 2021).

9

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2020), White nationalist groups in the
US has increased by 55% since 2017. The rise in White nationalist groups is problematic because
pro-White ideologies are associated with increases in domestic terrorism. Many cities in the US
(e.g., Charlottesville, VA, El Paso, TX, Pittsburgh, PA, etc.; Gamboa, 2019; McEldowney, 2018;
Robertson et al., 2018) have already experienced several displays of White nationalism. In El
Paso, TX, for example, a White nationalist drove to El Paso with the motive of stopping a
“Hispanic invasion of Texas”. Once the White nationalist reached El Paso, he entered a nearby
Walmart supercenter and killed several Latinos (Arango et al., 2019). The event devastated the
community.
A common theme among White nationalist dialogue is that they are experiencing a
significant amount of collective angst (i.e., anxiety toward the future of one’s group; Wohl et al.,
2010) produced by changing demographics (Hawkins & Saleem, 2021). For example, during the
Charlottesville riot (a public protest event in support for White nationalist beliefs), many White
nationalists expressed their anxiety by shouting that they refuse to be replaced by Jews and other
groups. During the riot, White nationalists held tiki torches, carried rifles, and one person who
was counter-protesting the event was killed (McEldowney, 2018).
Those feelings of collective angst have been empirically investigated and supported.
Across three experiments, Armenta and colleagues (2022) found that abrupt cultural and
demographic changes lead to increases in collective angst. In their experiments, the researchers
presented information regarding immigration trends in the US, but what was manipulated across
the three experiments was how the information was presented. In experiment one, the researchers
presented information to White participants from Iowa regarding what immigrant groups are
coming into the US and what areas in the US they are immigrating to. What changed across the
10

groups was whether the immigration surges would lead to abrupt changes to American culture or
no changes. In experiment two, Latino participants received vignettes with information regarding
Donald Trump’s proposed anti-immigration policies. What changed across two conditions was
whether Donald Trump’s anti-immigrant policies were expected to be an abrupt change to (but
continue being harsh anti-immigrant policies) or a continuation of harsh anti-immigrant policies
proposed by the republican party.
In experiment three (Armenta et al., 2022), White participants from Minnesota were
presented with data, graphs, and figures that framed the US to be predominantly White. What
changed across the two conditions was whether the foreign-born Latino population was stable
then abruptly increasing (i.e., the foreign-born Latino population was stable in the 1900s, but
then there was a sudden increase in the foreign-born Latino population in the 2000s) or whether
the foreign-born Latino population was continuously changing (i.e., there were increases and
decreases in the foreign-born Latino population across time). Both conditions expected the White
population to become a minority group by 2030 due to similar increases in the foreign-born
Latino population in the 2000s. Thus, the future remained constant across the two conditions.
Across all three experiments, participants who were presented with abrupt changes to US
demographics and/or abrupt changes to US culture reported significantly higher collective angst
on items such as, “I feel anxious about the future survival of the United States if the rate of
immigration due to Latino immigrants continues at its present rate” (for Whites), and “ I think
the future of the Latino-American way of life is under threat from immigration laws” (for
Latinos) in comparison to the stability (Experiment 1) and continuous change conditions
(Experiments 2 and 3; Armenta et al., 2022).
Voting Restrictions
11

Voting serves as one of the greatest vehicles to change or stabilize a society. As such, it is
no surprise that decisions regarding which US citizens should be allowed to vote (e.g., people
with felony convictions, immigrants; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022), how they should be
allowed to vote (e.g., mail in ballots, online voting; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022), and
through what methods should they be allowed to vote (e.g., 24-hour voting, drive-in voting;
Brennan Center for Justice, 2022) have become hot topics in American politics. Whereas
proponents of voting rights desire to expand voting rights, opponents of voting rights (generally
conservative individuals; Brennan Center for Justice, 2022) strive to limit voting rights. Despite
winning the house, senate, and presidency, Democrats, for instance, have failed to pass the John
Lewis Voting Rights acts, which aimed to expand voting rights in many of the aforementioned
ways (Reimann, 2021). In contrast, conservatives across 49 US states have enacted or proposed
over 400 bills aimed at making it more difficult for US citizens to vote (Brennan Center for
Justice, 2022).
Restricting voting rights may be a function of increasing diversity. Recent election cycles
have been largely determined by minority turnout, and increased minority turnout generally
benefits Democrats (Igielnik & Budiman, 2020). Similarly, local demographic change produced
by increases in US-born minorities can impact elections. For example, during the 2016
presidential election, demographic changes (i.e., increases in Hispanics in Florida, Georgia,
Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington) were associated with increased support
toward Donald Trump’s opponents, not Donald Trump, among those who voted during the 2016
presidential election (Hill et al., 2019). In other words, as places become more diverse, those
who vote, tend to lean toward democratic candidates. Similarly, research that simulates and
predicts how future elections will conclude while considering demographic changes in
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generational status, race/ethnicity, and age, have consistently found that future election models
favor democrats (American Progress, 2020). Thus, it is no surprise that conservatives have
mobilized to strategically suppress minorities from voting.
Endorsement of conservative policies have already been studied within a CIM
framework. Past studies have demonstrated that framing demographic change as abrupt to White
individuals causes them to be significantly more likely to support conservative policies such as
anti-immigrant bills and less likely to support bills that benefit racial/ethnic minority groups
(Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012). Ultimately, research demonstrates that demographic
changes increase voting practices in White individuals for conservative policies. However, not
much research has investigated whether types of demographic changes lead to increased support
in restricting voting rights. Given that demographic change in the US implies increasing diversity
(because demographic change is primarily driven by increases in minority groups such as
foreign-born and US-born Latinos), then it is possible that making demographic change salient,
to White individuals will increase their support for restricting voting rights, especially when the
demographic change is presented as abrupt.
VIOLENT RADICALIZATION: A NEW MEDIATOR?
There is a growing body of literature that has investigated violent radicalization – and it
is a serious issue in the US (National Institute of Justice, 2015; Swan, 2020). Despite the
growing body of research on violent radicalization, there is very little consensus on what violent
radicalization is (Borum, 2011). In the literature, most operationalizations of violent
radicalization differ in their definitions, but acceptance of physical violence is a central and
common theme among all definitions (Borum, 2011). Much of the research on violent
radicalization has focused on violent international terrorism. However, some research is now
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focused on explaining White nationalism (the number one domestic terrorist threat in the US;
Swan, 2020) via violent radicalization.
Recently, Ozer and Bertelsen (2018) have developed their own operationalization of
violent radicalization (i.e., a process through which severe intolerance and violent physical
aggression toward dissimilar others is adopted). Based on the aforementioned operationalization,
previous research has found that violent radicalization is negatively linked to agreeableness and
conscientiousness (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). Additionally, research has demonstrated that
deficient life skills positively predict extremism (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2020). The National Institute
of Justice (2015) has also outlined other predictors of violent radicalization such as: bad mental
health, trauma, identity conflict, lack of meaning in life, societal injustice, and strong religious
beliefs. Though, there is not much research directly testing whether increasing diversity and/or
demographic change leads to increases in violent radicalization.
Violent radicalization has been theorized to explain recent White nationalism
demonstrations (Kydd, 2021), however, violent radicalization has yet to be directly studied
empirically as a potential mediator. Considering that mass right-wing radicalization is increasing
in the US (Smith, 2018), and the CIM proposes that people react against cultural and
demographic change with the motive of maintaining the status quo (Zárate et al., 2019), it is
possible that violent radicalization is a function of demographic change that also explains
increased support toward far-right political leaders (including President Donald Trump),
collective action for White nationalism, and support for restricting voting rights.
Additionally, one risk factor for violent radicalization according to the National Institute
of Justice is feeling under threat (2015). Given that demographic change has been found to lead
to higher levels of group status threat (Major et al., 2016; Craig and Richeson, 2014), and it is
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theorized that violent radicalization may also be a function of demographic change, it could be
the case that demographic change may effect support for right-wing authoritarian leaders,
including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action for White nationalism, and support
for voting restrictions through increases in group status threat and violent radicalization.
US-BORN VERSUS FOREIGN-BORN LATINOS
The Latino population in the US has grown substantially since the last decade. There are
now 62.1 million Latinos living in the US, which accounts for 18.7% of the total population.
Among this population, about 67% are US-born and the rest are immigrants (i.e., 33% of Latinos
are foreign-born; Passel et al., 2022). Whereas the principal driver of Latino growth in the US has
historically been immigration (Stepler & Hugo Lopez, 2016), the primary driver of Latino growth
in the US is now increased US births. In fact, it is now the case that there are more Latino
immigrants (specifically Mexicans) leaving the US, than coming to the US (Gonzales-Barrera,
2015).
Despite the facts, White Americans continue to overestimate the percentage of
unauthorized foreign-born Latinos living in the US and underestimate the percentage of US-born
Latinos living in the US (Latino Donor Collaborative, 2021). For example, White Americans
report that unauthorized Latinos comprise about 32% of the Latino population (the actual
percentage is 13%) and report that only about 34% of Latinos are US-born (the actual percentage
is 67%). These numbers might be driven by increases in the dissemination of misinformation.
On the 2016 campaign trail, Donald Trump focused his rhetoric on Latino immigrants.
During one of his rallies, Mr. Trump stated:
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you.
They’re not sending you . . ., ” he said. "They’re sending people that have lots of problems,
15

and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing
crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.” (as cited in Kopan, 2016).
Mr. Trump’s rhetoric is in line with White American’s favorability toward authorized Latinos
(which includes authorized foreign-born immigrants and US-born Latinos) and their
unfavourability toward unauthorized Latino immigrants. The majority of White Americans (89%)
report favorable attitudes toward authorized Latinos versus a majority of White Americans (67%)
report unfavorable attitudes toward unauthorized foreign-born Latinos. In line with those findings,
foreign-born Latinos (41%) report more discrimination than third or higher generation of US-born
Latinos (27%; Lopez et al., 2018). As a result of increases in prejudice and, in turn, anti-Latino
hate crimes (Campbell et al., 2018), more foreign-born Latinos (57%) than US-born Latinos (42%)
report having serious concerns about their place in the US (Lopez et al., 2018).
The heightened negative immigrant socio-political climate suggests that perceived
increases in foreign-born Latinos should illicit significantly higher negative reactions in
comparison to perceived increases in US-born Latinos. While this has yet to be studied via a CIM
framework, the CIM does predict that prejudice is not directed equally to all outgroups. Per the
CIM, prejudice is heightened and focused on those who are believed to be changing cultural norms,
tapestries, and like previous research, the group prototype (e.g., non-English speaking immigrants;
Danbold and Huo, 2015; Hopkins et al., 2014; Zárate et al., 2019). Thus, it is predicted that
presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt should illicit higher
group status threat, violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, including
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action for White nationalism, and voting restrictions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANCHORS
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Considering that cultural and demographic change is stressful (Holmes & Rahe, 1967)
and inevitable, it is important to investigate who is more likely to react toward change, especially
change that is theorized to challenge the self-concept. Thus, the CIM identifies individual
difference variables that exacerbate negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change.
Those individual difference measures are termed psychological anchors (i.e., an individual
difference variable that facilitates one’s need for cultural and demographic stability). A
psychological anchor is like a regular anchor. An anchor prevents a vessel from moving forward
and onward. Similarly, a psychological anchor prevents an individual from moving forward and
onward, and ultimately prevents individuals from accepting change. Thus, those higher in
psychological anchors are theorized to react the most negatively toward cultural and
demographic change (Zárate et al., 2019).
Racial identity is a psychological anchor, among White individuals. Research
demonstrates that those higher in racial/ethnic identity react the most negatively toward outgroup
members that threaten to change group norms and group dynamics (Quezada et al., 2011).
Additionally, highly identifying White individuals report the most support toward President
Donald Trump (Major et al., 2016) and the most support toward White nationalism, even after
controlling for political ideology (Reyna et al., 2022).
Similarly, national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a past state of one’s country)
is theorized to be a psychological anchor because it motivates individuals to idealize the past,
ignore current improvements in the present, and derogate those responsible for the perceived
current worsening conditions (Armenta et al., 2022; Smeekes et al., 2014). For example,
minority groups are often viewed as perpetual agents of change and are often scapegoated for
introducing cultural and demographic change to relatively static environments (Armenta et al.,
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2022; Zárate et al., 2019). Those higher in national nostalgia are more likely to report prejudice
toward ethnic/racial minorities (Armenta et al., 2019; 2022) as well as less support toward social
movements and the creation of new social norms (Armenta et al., 2021). This last effect,
however, disappeared once political ideology was included, suggesting that nostalgia and
political ideology might be testing similar constructs. For the current experiments, it is proposed
that national nostalgia will act as a moderator of the relationship between demographic change,
such that those high in national nostalgia who believe that abrupt demographic change is
occurring will be significantly more likely to report support for right-wing authoritarian leaders
(including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency), collective action for White nationalism, voting
right restrictions, violent radicalization, and group status threat.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPELLORS
The CIM also identifies individual difference variables that reduce negative reactions
toward cultural and demographic change, or potentially produce a desire for more change. Those
individual difference variables are termed psychological propellors (i.e., individual difference
variables that facilitate one’s need for cultural and demographic change). A psychological
propellor is like a regular propellor. A propellor allows a vessel to move forward and onward.
Similarly, a psychological propellor allows an individual to move forward and onward, and
ultimately allows individuals to accept or desire change. Thus, those higher in psychological
propellors are theorized to react the least negatively toward cultural and demographic change or
even react positively toward change (Zárate et al., 2019).
National prostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a future state of one’s country) is a
new construct that is theorized to act as a psychological propellor because it fosters a sense of
pragmaticism that motivates individuals to make better present decisions as a collective to
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increase the likelihood of a better future national context (Armenta et al., 2021). Research
demonstrates that those who score higher on national prostalgia report more support toward the
Black Lives Matter movement and the creation of new social norms, even after controlling for
social political ideology (Armenta et al., 2021). Additionally, national prostalgia has been linked
to lower negative attitudes toward Latino immigrants, outgroup derogation, and ingroup
protection (Armenta et al., 2019). Thus, it is proposed that national prostalgia will act as a
moderator of the relationship between demographic change such that those high in national
prostalgia who believe that abrupt demographic change is occurring will be significantly less
likely to report support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (including Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency), collective action for White nationalism, voting right restrictions, violent
radicalization, and group status threat.
THE CURRENT EXPERIMENTS
Drawing from the literature above, two experiments investigated methods through which
majority groups maintain the status quo. In both experiments, it was predicted that presenting
demographic change as abrupt would lead to higher violent radicalization, support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, and collective action for White nationalism. In Experiment 2, presenting
demographic change as abrupt (compared to presenting demographic change as continuous) was
predicted to lead to higher group status threat and support for restricting voting rights. Increases
in violent radicalization (Experiment 1 and 2) and group status threat (Experiment 2) was
predicted to mediate those effects. National nostalgia and prostalgia were investigated as
potential psychological anchors and propellors of the predicted effects (Experiments 1 and 2).
Data, code, and materials corresponding to Experiment 1 and 2 can be found here:
https://osf.io/fpm8c/?view_only=ae6026ccb6e94ac5ab4082ec114dd82f
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Chapter 2: Experiment 1
Whereas outside forces, such as immigrants are perceived as a push from outside, internal
motivators, like those born in the host country, might be perceived as natural change and thus
produce less reactivity. Thus, Experiment 1 investigated whether presenting demographic change
produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt would lead to higher violent radicalization, support
for right-wing authoritarian leaders (including Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency), and collective
action for White nationalism. It was predicted that those in the abrupt demographic change
produced by foreign-born Latinos condition would report more support for the outcomes than
those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and the control
conditions. Those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition
were predicted to report higher support for the outcome variables than those in the control
condition.
Additionally, those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos
condition who were higher on national nostalgia and national prostalgia were predicted to
respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the outcome variables in comparison to
those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and control conditions.
Additionally, it was predicted that those high in national nostalgia and national prostalgia in the
abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition would respectively report
higher and lower support for the outcomes in comparison to those in the control condition. It was
predicted that there would be a significant indirect effect of demographic change on the
outcomes through increased violent radicalization, such that those in the abrupt demographic
change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition would report higher support for the outcome
variables than those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos and control
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conditions through increases in violent radicalization. Those in the demographic change
produced by US-born Latinos condition were predicted to report higher support for the outcome
variables in comparison to those in the control condition through increases in violent
radicalization. Lastly, it was predicted that the effects would persist (i.e., remain significant) after
controlling for social political ideology. The conceptual model for Experiment 1 is in Figure 1
below.

Figure 1: Full Conceptual Model for Experiment 1.
METHODS
Participants
G*Power computer software was used to determine an appropriate sample size. The
analysis utilized the effect size for the relationship between demographic change and group
status threat (Craig & Richeson, 2014) to try to sufficiently power the relationship between
demographic change and violent radicalization. The findings from the power analysis
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demonstrated that to detect an effect of f = .17 with 80% power (numerator degrees of freedom =
2, number of groups = 3) for a fixed effects model, 315 participants will need to be recruited. I
collected 385 participants to account for missing data and outliers. Data collection was restricted
only to White individuals from the Mid-West (i.e., White individuals from Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, or
Wisconsin). Like in previous studies utilizing the CIM, the Mid-West in the US is
conceptualized as a static culture because the racial and political demographics in the Mid-West
have not changed significantly in over a century (i.e., over 70% of its’ residents identify as
White; over 80% of White Mid-West US residents identify as politically conservative; Pew
Research Center, 2014).
Data were collected via Amazon Mturk. Cloud Research (i.e., an Amazon Mturk
participant-sourcing platform; Litman et al., 2017) was utilized to restrict data collection only to
White individuals residing within the Mid-West and to recruit a politically conservative majority.
Participants who did not meet the data collection criterion were not allowed to participate in the
study. Amazon Mturk and Cloud Research have been utilized in various studies (Chmielewski &
Kucker, 2020; Litman et al., 2017) and Amazon Mturk has been found to face data quality
collection issues. However, recent research demonstrates that there are methods of mitigating
poor data quality issues (Chmielewski & Kucker, 2020). To prevent low-quality responses,
several verification questions were integrated into the survey that were worded similarly to the
rest of the items. For example, “What our country needs most is select “somewhat agree” if you
are paying attention.” If the participant did not select the option specified in the item, they were
kicked out of the survey. Thus, all participants in the final sample passed the attention checks. A
total of 2 individuals did not complete the questionnaires at all (and thus were excluded from the
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sample) and 63 people were kicked out the survey for failing the attention checks. Thus, the final
sample was comprised of 320 White participants from the Midwest. There was a similar number
of people between the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos (n = 105),
abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos (n = 110), and no-narrative (n = 105)
conditions. Most participants identified as female (53%), reported currently living in a somewhat
to very urban community (52%) with no to very little demographic change happening in their
community (63%), and reported making between $10,000 to $59,999 a year (65%). As expected,
all participants identified as White (100%), and most identified as slightly to very conservative
(58%) with an average age of 43 (SD = 12.62).
Procedure and Design
After consenting to participate, participants were asked to complete national nostalgia,
national prostalgia, White identity (for exploratory purposes), and social political ideology
measures. Afterward, participants were assigned to one of three conditions – Abrupt
Demographic Change produced by foreign-born Latinos, Abrupt Demographic Change produced
by US-born Latinos, or the control condition. Participants then answered the manipulation
checks and violent radicalization measures (in this exact order), followed by the support for
right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for
white nationalism questionnaires presented in a random order. Exploratory questions and
demographics (e.g., sex, age, income, etc.) were asked at the end of the experiment. Finally,
participants were debriefed, thanked, and granted $1.50 for their participation. The average time
it took to complete the study was 17 minutes. All materials, including the manipulations and how
the variables were measured can be found in Appendices A-D. All items were reverse coded so
that higher numbers meant higher support for the construct.
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MATERIALS
National Nostalgia
Participants first read a definition of national nostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a
past state of one’s country). Participants then responded to a total of 6 items regarding national
nostalgia (Routledge et al., 2008; Batcho, 1995; Smeekes et al., 2014). All items were rated on a
7-point likert scale (1 = not all, 7 = very much). An example item is, “How nostalgic do you feel
about the way American society was in the past?”. The national nostalgia measure in this sample
was found to be reliable (α = .94). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded
strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 4.59). No other factors were retained.
National Prostalgia
Participants first read a definition of national prostalgia (i.e., a sentimental longing for a
future state of one’s country). A total of 6 items were used to measure national prostalgia
(Armenta et al., 2021). All items were rated on a 7-point likert scale (1 = not all, 7 = very much).
An example item is, “How prostalgic do you feel about the way American society will be in the
future?” The national prostalgia measure in this sample was found to be reliable (α = .94). Based
on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue =
4.61). No other factors were retained.
White Identity
Participants rated how strongly they identified with their racial group on a 4-item racial
identity measure adapted from Phinney (1992). The White identity scale was included for
exploratory purposes only and only used 4 items to limit the number of items the participants
completed. The items were measured on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). An example item is, “I have a strong sense of belonging to my own racial group.” The
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White identity measure in this sample was found to be reliable (α = .86). Based on a principal
components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.81). No other
factors were retained.
Social Political Ideology
One item measured participant’s social political ideology. The item was as follows:
“Here is a 7-point scale on which the social views that people might hold are arranged from
extremely socially liberal (left) to extremely socially conservative (right). Where would you
place yourself on this scale?” The response options ranged from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very
conservative).
Perception of Demographic Change manipulations
Participants were randomly assigned to either the abrupt demographic change produced
by foreign-born Latinos condition, the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos
condition, or the control condition. In the abrupt demographic change conditions, participants
were presented with a series of PowerPoint slides that contained a combination of factual (e.g.,
White individuals have historically been the majority group in the US; the birth rate of Latinas
surpasses the birth rate of White women) and non-factual Latino information (e.g., framing the
percentage of Latinos as abruptly increasing in the 2000s) in the US stemming from the 1900s to
the present 2020s. The information presented in both the abrupt demographic change conditions
was manipulated so that the information corresponded to either Foreign-born Latinos or US-born
Latinos.
In both the abrupt demographic change conditions, the US was described as “a nation that
thrives on stability.” Participants received a timeline stemming from the 1900s to the present
2020s. The timeline showcased a consistently White America across time. To manipulate abrupt
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demographic change, participants received a graph depicting the foreign-born or the US-born
Latino population ranging from 1920 to 2020. The data were presented so that the foreign-born
(or the US-born) Latino population was stable across time, with a large and sudden increase in
the foreign-born (or the US-born) Latino population from 2011-2021. To make the information
personal to the participants, participants also received slides with information showcasing that
just like the US, the mid-west has been predominantly White, but there has been an abrupt
increase in the foreign-born (or US-born) Latino population, which threatened the majority group
standing of White individuals in the mid-west. At the end of the PowerPoint presentation,
participants were shown a slide demonstrating that the US’s demographics, including the midwest, are expected to change dramatically as a result of abrupt increases to either the Foreignborn or US-born Latino populations, and that the White population will no longer be the majority
group in the US by 2042. Those in the control condition did not receive a presentation and were
only asked to complete the measures. For the remainder of the paper, the control condition in
Experiment 1 will be referred to as the “no-narrative” condition.
Manipulation checks
Participants were asked to complete three manipulation checks. The first two
manipulation checks were: “The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to
increases in Latinos born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US” and “the current
demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside
(i.e., US-born Latinos) the US”. These two items were measured via a 7-point likert-type scale (1
= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The purpose of the first two manipulation checks was to
determine whether the presentation successfully manipulated the perception that the
demographic changes in the US were a product of either Foreign-born or US-born Latinos. The
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third manipulation check was “Do you believe the White American population in the US to be:”.
The response choices were 1 (Greatly decreasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly increasing in the
future). The response options were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant that the White
population was greatly decreasing. The purpose of the third manipulation check was to determine
whether those in the abrupt demographic change conditions believed that the White population
would decrease in the future more so than those in the no-narrative condition.
Violent radicalization
Violent radicalization was measured via 10 items (Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). The items
were measured via a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example
item is, “In the end, there must be a confrontation – one can’t forever live peacefully, side by
side with people who live a completely different life than they are obligated to live.” Another
example is, “Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of
preventing repression and assault of my people.” The violent radicalization measure in this
sample was found to be reliable (α = .94). Based on a principal components analysis, all items
loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 6.63). No other factors were retained.
Support for Right-Wing Authoritarian Leaders
Eight items measured support for right-wing authoritarian leaders (Rattazzi et al., 2007).
All items were measured via a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An
example item is, “The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our
traditional values, put some tough leader in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad
ideas.” The right-wing authoritarianism measure in this sample was found to be reliable (α =
.93). Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor
(Eigenvalue = 5.38). No other factors were retained.
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Support for Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency
A 4-item measure of support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency was created for the
purposes of this study. All items were on 7-point likert-type scales. Those items were: “If Donald
Trump runs for president in 2024, I intend to fully support him” (1 – strongly agree to 7 –
strongly disagree), “How likely are you to vote for Donald Trump in 2024?” (1 – Extremely
likely to 7 – Extremely unlikely), “How warm do you feel toward Donald Trump?” (1 – not at all
to 7 – totally), and “How much do you like Donald Trump?” (1 – Dislike a great deal to 7 – Like
a great deal). The support for Donald Trump measure was found to be reliable (α = .96). Based
on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue =
3.62). No other factors were retained.
Support for Collective Action for White Nationalism
Collective action for White nationalism was adapted from the White nationalism beliefs
scale (Reyna et al., 2022) and measured via 5 items. All items were measured via a 7-point
likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). An example item is, “Whites should
take to the streets to protest demographic changes happening in the America”. The support for
collective action for White nationalism scale was found to be reliable (α = .88) in this sample.
Based on a principal components analysis, all items loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue
= 3.39). No other factors were retained.
Exploratory Items
Participants also answered 2 items regarding their support for the Black Lives Matter
movement and their support for the alternative right movement. Those items were “Support for
the Black Lives Matter movement” and “Support for Alternative Right movement” (1 – Strongly
oppose and 7 – Strongly support). Participants then answered 3 items regarding their beliefs in
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minority collusion. Those items were: “Minorities may disagree about some things, one thing
they agree on is that they don’t like White people”, Despite their differences, different minority
groups regard White people as a common enemy”, and “Different minority groups are willing to
cooperate with each other in order to take power away from White people.” The last three items
(α = .88) had a 7-point response format that ranged from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly
disagree) and loaded onto 1 factor (Eigenvalue = 2.59).
Demographics
Lastly, participants answered questions regarding their sex, age, race/ethnicity, income,
how urban/rural (1 = Very Urban, 7 = Very Rural) their community is, and the amount of
demographic change (1 = Not at all, 7 = Totally) happening in their community.
RESULTS
Primary Analyses
Manipulation Checks
General linear models were utilized to assess the manipulation checks. For the first
manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to
increases in Latinos born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US”), the findings
demonstrated a significant main effect, F(2, 317) = 61.24, p < .0001, ηp2 = .28. As expected,
participants in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition
reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change happening in the
US was a function of increases in Foreign-born Latinos (M = 5.11; SD = 1.42) compared to those
who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos (M = 2.71; SD =
1.76), F(1, 317) = 122.48, p < .0001, ηp2 = .28, and no-narrative conditions (M = 3.87; SD =
1.54), F(1, 317) = 31.96, p < .0001, ηp2 = .09. Those in the no-narrative condition reported
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significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic changes in the US were due to
foreign-born Latinos in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change produced by USborn Latinos condition, F(1, 337) = 28.61, p < .0001, ηp2 = .08.
For the second manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in
the US are due to increases in Latinos born and raised inside (i.e., US-born Latinos) the US”),
there was a significant main effect, F(2, 317) = 30.76, p < .0001, ηp2 = .16. The results
demonstrated that participants in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos
condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the demographic change
happening in the US was a function of increases in US-born Latinos (M = 5.62; SD = 1.45)
compared to those who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born
Latinos (M = 4.20; SD = 1.74), F(1, 317) = 43.95, p < .0001, ηp2 = .12, and the no-narrative
conditions (M = 4.14; SD = 1.52), F(1, 317) = 47.54, p < .0001, ηp2 = .12. There were no
significant differences between those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreignborn Latinos and no-narrative conditions, F(1, 317) = .07, p = .793, ηp2 = .0002.
Finally, there was a significant main effect for the third manipulation check (i.e., “Do you
believe the White American population in the US to be:”. The response choices were 1 (Greatly
increasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly decreasing in the future) after being reverse coded, F(2,
317) = 30.76, p < .0001, ηp2 = .02. Those in the abrupt demographic change produced by USborn Latinos condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the White
population would be decreasing in the future (M = 3.98; SD = .88) in comparison to those in the
no-narrative condition (M = 3.66; SD = .92), F(1, 317) = 6.28, p = .012, ηp2 = .01. There was no
difference between those in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos
and those in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos conditions, F(1, 317)
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= 3.61, p = .058, ηp2 = .01. There was also no difference between those in the abrupt
demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos and no-narrative conditions, F(1, 317) =
.36, p = .549, ηp2 = .001.
Analytical Approach
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to test the effects of type of demographic
change on violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s
2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism. The analyses were conducted via
separate models. Abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos was coded as 1,
no-narrative was coded as 2, and abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos was
coded as 3. The moderators were mean-centered. In step 1, condition, and national nostalgia (or
national prostalgia) were entered into the models. In step 2, condition, national nostalgia (or
national prostalgia), and the condition by national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) interaction
were entered into the models. If a finding was significant, then in step 3, social political ideology
was entered into the model in addition to the aforementioned predictors. One standard deviation
above the mean was conceptualized as high national nostalgia and prostalgia. All beta
coefficients corresponding to Experiment 1 are unstandardized. Correlations between all
variables of interest and means and standard deviations for each variable are reported in Table 1
below. Below are the conceptual models (Figures 2 and 3) corresponding to the interactions
between condition and national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) on the dependent variables.
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Figure 2: Conceptual Model for the Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on the
Dependent Variables.

Figure 3: Conceptual Model for the Interaction Between Condition and National Prostalgia on
the Dependent Variables.
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Table 1: Correlations Between All Variables of Interest for Experiment 1
Variable

1

1. National Nostalgia

---

2. National Prostalgia

.41***

---

3. White Identity

.43***

.15**

---

4. Political Ideology

.45***

.08

.43***

---

5. Violent Radicalization

.42***

.22

.35***

.35***

---

6. Right-Wing Leaders

.52***

.24***

.48***

.55***

.72***

---

7. Donald Trump

.48***

.15**

.43***

.69***

.42***

.69***.

---

8. Collective Action

.40***

.18*

.42***

.38***

.72***

.66***

.45*** ---

M

3.78

3.41

5.10

4.47

3.07

3.46

3.63

3.10

1.57

1.48

1.11

1.96

1.34

1.54

2.21

1.44

SD
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

2

3
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4

5

6

7

8

Effects with Demographic Change and National Nostalgia as Predictors
There were no significant main effects of condition predicting violent radicalization,
t(317) = -0.18, p = .860, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(317) = 0.49, p = .627,
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(316) = -1.01, p = .313, or collective action for White
nationalism, t(317) = 0.17, p = .866. Despite being a single factor construct, post-hoc review of
the violent radicalization measure demonstrated that participants were scoring qualitatively
higher on the first five items of the violent radicalization measure regarding ideological
extremism and radicalization (e.g., “In the end there must be confrontation – one cannot forever
live peacefully, side by side with people who live a completely different life than they are
obligated to live”; M = 3.07; SD = 1.34) in comparison to the last five items of the measure
regarding physical violence (e.g., “Using physical violence is the only thing that really works
when it is a matter of creating proper conditions for those whom one feels a solidarity.”; M =
2.09; SD = 1.43). This is consistent with other studies that have studied violent radicalization
(Ozer & Bertelsen, 2018). Given the low variance in the second set of items, for the next set of
analyses, a new composite (which was conceptualized as ideological radicalization, i.e., a
process through which severe ideological intolerance for dissimilar others is adopted) utilizing
the first five items was created and analyzed via post-hoc analyses. This new set of items was
found to be reliable (α = .87). The post-hoc analyses revealed that there was not a significant
main effect of condition predicting ideological radicalization, t(317) = 0.07, p = .942.
There were no significant interactions between condition and national nostalgia for
violent radicalization utilizing the original scale (i.e., all 10 items), t(316) = -1.34, p = .18,
support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(316) = -2.03, p = .103, or collective action for
White nationalism, t(316) = -1.53, p = .126. Post-hoc analyses revealed that when utilizing the
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ideological radicalization measure, the findings demonstrated that there was a marginal overall
interaction between condition and national nostalgia on ideological radicalization, b = -.10,
t(316) = -1.87, p = .062. Those high in national nostalgia who were in the no-narrative condition
reported significantly lower ideological radicalization, b = -.508, t(314) = -2.20, p = .028,
compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change
produced by foreign-born Latinos condition. There were no significant differences in ideological
radicalization between those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change
produced by US-born Latinos condition compared to those high in national nostalgia and in the
abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition, t(314) = -1.24, p =
.213, or those high in national nostalgia and in the no-narrative condition, t(314) = .867, p =
.386. The relationship between national nostalgia and ideological radicalization was significant
in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the abrupt demographic change produced by
foreign-born Latinos condition compared to all other conditions. These effects are illustrated in
Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Ideological Radicalization.
Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting
ideological radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
There was also a significant interaction between condition and national nostalgia on
support for Donald Trump, b = -.20, t(316) = -2.34, p = .020. As predicted, those high in national
nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change produced by US-born Latinos condition
reported significantly lower support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency in comparison to those
in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos condition, b = -.99, t(314) =
-2.45, p = .015. There was not a significant difference in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency
support between those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change produced
by foreign-born Latinos condition compared to those high in national nostalgia and in the nonarrative condition, t(314) = -.639, p = .522. Additionally, there was not a significant difference
in Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency support between those high in national nostalgia and in the
no-narrative condition and those high in national nostalgia and in the abrupt demographic change
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produced by US-born Latinos condition, t(314) = .649, p = .517. The relationship between
national nostalgia and support for Donald Trump was significant in all conditions but was
qualitatively larger in the abrupt demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos
condition compared to all other conditions. These effects are illustrated in Figure 5 below.

Figure 5: Interaction Between Condition and National nostalgia on Support for Donald Trump’s
2024 Presidency. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia
predicting violent radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Next, it was investigated whether the significant interactions found in step 2 of the
hierarchical regression analyses would hold even after including social political ideology as a
covariate in the model. The findings demonstrated that there were no significant interactions
between condition and national nostalgia on ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses),
t(315) = -1.56, p = .120, or support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(315) = -.96, p = .339.
Effects with Demographic Change and National Prostalgia as Predictors
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There were no significant main effects of condition predicting violent radicalization,
t(317) = 0.15, p = .881, ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses), t(317) = 0.24, p = .808,
support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(317) = 0.55, p = .580, Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency, t(317) = -0.96, p = .339, or collective action for White nationalism, t(317) = 0.15, p =
.882. There were no significant interactions between condition and national prostalgia predicting
violent radicalization, t(316) = 0.05, p = .957, ideological radicalization (via post-hoc analyses),
t(316) = 0.09, p = .926, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(316) = -0.07, p = .943,
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(316) = -0.15, p = .882, or collective action for White
nationalism, t(316) = -0.10, p = .919. Since none of the effects were significant, social political
ideology was not tested as a covariate.
Mediation Analyses
To test the direct and indirect effects of the manipulation on support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White
nationalism through violent radicalization (with all 10 items) via separate models, model 4 from
Hayes (2012) PROCESS SPSS macro was used. The models utilized 5,000 bootstrapping
resamples to produce 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The first set of models did not
control for social political ideology. If the results yielded significant findings, then a second set
of models controlling for social political ideology would be run. Figure 6 below corresponds to
the conceptual mediation model being tested. The models (See table 2 for full results) where
right-wing authoritarian leadership support, F(2, 316) = 134.68, p < .001, R2 = .46, support for
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(2, 317) = 25.18, p < .001, R2 = .14, and collective action for
White nationalism, F(2, 317) = 109.14, p < .001, R2 = .41, were the dependent variables were
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significant. However, the total, direct, and indirect effects in each the models were
nonsignificant.1

Figure 6: Conceptual Model of Condition on the Dependent Variables through Violent
Radicalization

An additional post-hoc analysis was conducted to determine whether there was an indirect effect of the
manipulation onto support for Donald trump among those high in national nostalgia through ideological
radicalization. This analysis was conducted via SPSS process macro using similar model specifications as those in
previous mediation analyses. This analysis, however, utilized model 8. The findings demonstrated that there was not
a significant indirect effect of the manipulation onto Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency through ideological
radicalization among those high in national nostalgia, b = -.07, 95% CI [-.20, .05].
1
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Table 2: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects of Condition on the Dependent Variables Through Violent Radicalization.
Variable

Total Effect

Direct Effect (Condition
on dependent variables)

Indirect Effect (Condition on dependent
variables through ideological radicalization)

Right-Wing Authoritarian
Leaders

.03 [-.12, .19]

.003 [-.21, .20]

-.03 [-.17, .11]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

-.20 [-.49, .10]

-.17 [-.45, .11]

-.03 [-.13, .08]

Collective Action for White
Nationalism

-.02 [-.14, .11]

-.003 [-.09, .10]

-.02 [-.10, .06]

Note: Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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Additional Post-hoc Analyses
Since national nostalgia and prostalgia were significantly correlated with the dependent
variables, additional analyses were conducted to test the direct and indirect effects of national
nostalgia and prostalgia on the dependent variables through violent radicalization while
controlling for social political ideology. Condition was also added as a covariate in order to
control for any effects the manipulations may have had on the outcome variables. The analyses
were conducted via SPSS process macro and had similar model specifications as those in
previous mediation analyses. Model 4 was utilized (See Figures 7 and 8 for conceptual models).
Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported below.

Figure 7: Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables
Through Violent Radicalization.
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Figure 8: Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables
through Violent Radicalization.
Mediation Models with National Nostalgia as the Focal Predictor
The models with support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, F(4, 314) = 134.94, p <
.0001, R2 = .63, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(4, 315) = 91.32, p < .0001, R2 =
.54, and collective action for White nationalism, F(4, 315) = 75.03, p < .0001, R2 = .49, as
dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there was a significant total
effect of national nostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald
Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism, such that increases in
national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome variables. There were also significant direct
effects for national nostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, and support for
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (i.e., national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome
variables), but not for collective action for White nationalism. Lastly, there were several
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significant indirect effects. National nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s presidency, and collective action for White
nationalism, through increases in violent radicalization. See Table 3 for a summary of the results.
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Table 3: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables Through Violent
Radicalization.
Variable

Total Effect

Direct Effect (National nostalgia
on dependent variables)

Indirect Effect (National nostalgia on dependent
variables through violent radicalization)

Right-Wing
Authoritarian Leaders

.33 [.24, .42]

.15 [.07, .23]

.18 [.10, .25]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

.28 [.16, .40]

.20 [.08, .33]

.07 [.02, .13]

Collective Action for
White Nationalism

.14 [.08, .20]

.03 [-.03, .08]

.11 [.07, .16]

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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Mediation Models with National Prostalgia as the Focal Predictor
The models with support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, F(4, 313) = 126.89, p <
.0001, R2 = .62, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(4, 314) = 85.55, p < .0001, R2 =
.52, and collective action for White nationalism, F(4, 314) = 76.78, p < .0001, R2 = .49, as
dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there was a significant total
effect of national prostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, and support for
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, such that national prostalgia predicted increases in support for
right-wing authoritarian leaders and Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency. However, there was not a
significant total effect of national prostalgia on collective action for White nationalism. There
were no significant direct effects of national prostalgia on support for right-wing authoritarian
leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, or for collective action for White
nationalism. Lastly, there were several significant indirect effects. National prostalgia predicted
increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency, and collective action for White nationalism, through increases in violent
radicalization. See table 4 for a summary of the results.
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Table 4: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables Through Violent
Radicalization.
Variable

Total Effect

Direct Effect (National prostalgia
on dependent variables)

Indirect Effect (National prostalgia on dependent
variables through violent radicalization)

Right-Wing
Authoritarian Leaders

.21 [.11, .30]

-.06 [-.02, .13]

.15 [.07, .22]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

.13 [.01, .25]

.06 [-.06, .18]

.07 [.03, .13]

Collective Action for
White Nationalism

.03 [-.03, .10]

-.06 [-.11, -.009]

.09 [.05, .14]

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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DISCUSSION
The findings from Experiment 1 were mixed. While there were no significant main
effects and the majority of the predicted interactions were nonsignificant, there were two
significant interactions between the experimental manipulations and national nostalgia on
ideological radicalization and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency. Specifically, those
high in national nostalgia who believed that abrupt demographic change was being produced by
foreign-born Latinos reported significantly higher ideological radicalization (via post-hoc
analyses) and support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (as predicted). These findings extend
previous findings utilizing the CIM (Armenta et al., 2022; Zárate et al., 2012). In addition, there
were several indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome variables
through increases in violent radicalization. Like in previous collective nostalgia studies (Armenta
et al., 2022; Reyna et al., 2022), increases in collective nostalgia led to increased intergroup
hostility. However, these findings are unique in that violent radicalization was directly observed
as the vehicle that produces systematic intergroup hostility. Further, the national prostalgia
findings are inconsistent with previous research (Armenta et al., 2021). National prostalgia
predicted higher support for the outcomes via increases in violent radicalization. The findings
from Experiment 1 will be further discussed in the general discussion.
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Chapter 3: Experiment 2
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to conceptually replicate the effects in Experiment 1
and extend them by investigating whether presenting demographic change produced by foreignborn Latinos as continuous serves as a solution for reducing hostile reactions. It was predicted
that those in the abrupt demographic change condition would report more support for group
status threat, violent radicalization, right-wing authoritarian leadership support, support for
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and support for voting right restrictions than
those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions. Those in the continuous
demographic change condition were predicted to report higher support for the outcome variables
than those in the control condition. Additionally, those in the abrupt demographic change
condition who were higher on national nostalgia and national prostalgia were predicted to
respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the outcome variables in comparison to
those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions. It was also predicted that
those in the continuous demographic change condition who were higher on national nostalgia
and national prostalgia would respectively report higher and lower levels of support for the
outcome variables in comparison to those in the control condition.
It was also predicted that there would be a significant indirect effect of demographic
change on the outcomes through increased group status threat and/or violent radicalization, such
that those in the abrupt demographic change condition would report higher support for the
outcome variables than those in the continuous demographic change and control conditions
through increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. Those in the continuous
demographic change condition were predicted to report higher levels of support for the outcome
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variables than those in the control condition through increased group status threat and/or violent
radicalization. The conceptual model for Experiment 2 is in Figure 9 below.

Figure 9: Full Conceptual Model Being Hypothesized for Experiment 2.
METHODS
Participants
G*Power computer software was used to determine an appropriate sample size. The
analysis utilized the effect size for the relationship between abrupt demographic change versus
continuous demographic change and threat found in previous studies utilizing the CIM (Armenta
et al., 2022) to sufficiently power the relationship between demographic change (abrupt versus
continuous) and violent radicalization. It should be noted that the effect size (ηp2 = .0297) found
in previous CIM studies (Armenta et al., 2022) was similar to the effect size between
demographic change and ideological radicalization found for the simple effects in Experiment 1
(ηp2 = .0299). The findings from the power analysis demonstrated that to detect an effect of f =
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.1749 with 80% power (numerator degrees of freedom = 2, number of groups = 3) for a fixed
effects model, 318 participants will need to be recruited. I collected 402 participants to account
for missing data and outliers.
Like in Experiment 1, Amazon Mturk and Cloud Research (Litman et al., 2017) was
utilized to restrict data collection to only White individuals residing in the Mid-west and to
ensure a politically conservative majority. Additionally, like in Experiment 1, in order to prevent
low-quality responses, several verification questions were integrated into the survey that were
worded similarly to the rest of the items. For example, “Attend public protests where if you are
paying attention select ‘disagree’.” If the participant did not select the option specified in the
item, they were kicked out of the survey. Thus, all participants in the final sample successfully
passed all the attention checks. A total of 8 people did not complete any of the questionnaires
(and thus were excluded) and 56 participants were booted out the survey, resulting in a final
sample of 340 White participants from the Midwest. There was a similar number of participants
in the perceived abrupt demographic change (n = 117), perceived continuous demographic
change (n = 114), and control (n = 109) conditions. Most participants identified as female (55%),
reported currently living in a somewhat to very urban community (57%) with no to very little
demographic change happening in their community (57%), and reported making between
$10,000 to $59,999 a year (67%). As expected, all participants identified as White (100%), and
most identified as slightly to very conservative (52%) with an average age of 41 (SD = 12.96).
Procedure and Design
After consenting to participate, participants completed the national nostalgia, national
prostalgia, White identity (for exploratory purposes), and social political ideology measures.
Afterward, participants were assigned to one of three conditions – Abrupt Demographic Change,
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Continuous Demographic Change, or the control condition. Participants then answered
manipulation checks, the group status threat and violent radicalization items (in this exact order),
followed by the support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, support for Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency, collective action, and expanding voting rights measures presented in a random order.
Finally, participants were debriefed, thanked, and granted $1.75 for their participation. The
average time it took to complete the survey was 19 minutes. All materials, including the
manipulations and the items utilized in Experiment 2 can be found in Appendices A-D.
MATERIALS
Perception of Demographic Change manipulations
Participants were randomly assigned to either the abrupt demographic change, the
continuous demographic change, or the control condition. Similar to the manipulations used in
Experiment 1, those in the abrupt and continuous demographic change conditions were presented
with a series of PowerPoint slides that contained a combination of factual (e.g., White
individuals have historically been the majority group in the US; the birth rate of Latinas
surpasses the birth rate of White women) and non-factual Latino information (e.g., framing the
percentage of Latinos as stable in the 1900s then abruptly increasing in the 2000s or
continuously changing across time with increases in the 2000s) in the US stemming from the
1900s to the present 2020s. However, there were noticeable differences between the conditions.
Those in the abrupt demographic change condition received a similar presentation as the
foreign-born Latino manipulation described in Experiment 1. In the continuous demographic
change condition, the US was described as a “nation that is always changing, always growing.”
To further manipulate continuous demographic change, participants received a timeline
stemming from the 1900s to the present 2020s. Contrary to the timeline in the abrupt
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demographic change condition which illustrated the US as a White country, those in the
continuous demographic change condition were shown a diverse US population with pictures of
foreign-born Latinos and Latinas who are currently residing in the US. To further manipulate
continuous demographic change, participants received a graph depicting the foreign-born Latino
population ranging from 1920 to 2020. The data were presented so that the foreign-born
population was constantly changing across time. This was illustrated by presenting the foreignborn population as constantly fluctuating with large dips and increases. To make the information
personal to the participants, participants also received slides with information showcasing that
just like the US, the Mid-west has been predominantly White, and that both the White population
and the foreign-born Latino population have increased and decreased across time since the late
1800s. Both the abrupt and continuous demographic change conditions expected a racially
diverse America in the 2020s where White individuals are the minority.
Unlike those in the abrupt and continuous change conditions, participants in the Nintendo
games condition served as a control group. The purpose here was to control for possible
confounding variables that were not controlled for in the no-narrative control condition in
Experiment 1 (e.g., receiving a presentation, reading, etc.). The participants received a
presentation with a similar structure as the abrupt and continuous demographic change
presentations. The information in the Nintendo games presentation was factual and neutral. For
example, those in the Nintendo games condition first reviewed a brief history of Nintendo since
the 1900s. They then received key points about Nintendo as well as a timeline illustrating the
evolution of Nintendo up to the 2020s. Participants also received a graph showcasing factual
Nintendo game sales from the 1900s to the 2020s. Finally, the participants received a slide

52

showcasing the future of Nintendo (i.e., upcoming games and new Nintendo amusement park
attractions).
MEASURES
The national nostalgia (α = .92), national prostalgia (α = .93), White identity (α = .81),
social political ideology, violent radicalization (α = .94), support for right-wing authoritarian
leaders (α = .93), and support for Donald trump’s 2024 presidency (α = .97) items were
measured via the same scales as those reported in Experiment 1 and were found to have high
internal consistency. Based on principle component analyses, and just like in Experiment 1, the
findings revealed that the items loaded strongly onto one factor for each of the scales: national
nostalgia (Eigenvalue = 4.39), national prostalgia (Eigenvalue = 4.49), White identity
(Eigenvalue = 2.57), violent radicalization (Eigenvalue = 6.78), right-wing authoritarian
leadership support (Eigenvalue = 5.26), and Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (Eigenvalue =
3.64). Below are the new items that were used after the manipulation in Experiment 2. All items
were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant higher support for the construct.
Manipulation Checks
There were three manipulation checks. The first two manipulation checks were: “The
current demographic changes happening in the US are drastically different from past patterns of
demographic change” and “The current demographic changes happening in the US are consistent
with past patterns of demographic change.” The purpose of the first two manipulation checks
was to determine whether the manipulations successfully made the participants believe that the
current demographic changes occurring in the US were different (i.e., abrupt) or similar (i.e.,
continuous) compared to past patterns of change, depending on the condition they were in. The
third manipulation was the same third manipulation check described in Experiment 1.
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Collective Action
Collective action was measured via 9-items (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). This collective
action scale was different and more subtle than the collective action scale presented in
Experiment 1. The reason for changing the collective action scale in Experiment 2 was to
investigate whether the predicted effects would be supported if the collective action was framed
as behaviors that challenged discrimination toward their racial group, rather than hostile
behaviors such as the hostile items presented in the collective action for White nationalism scale
in Experiment 1. Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they would be
willing to engage in different types of action to challenge discrimination toward people of their
racial group. Examples of collective action items are: “Attend demonstrations, protests, rallies”
and “Contact media to express my opinion.” All items were on a 7-point likert response format
that ranged from 1 – Extremely unlikely to 7 – Extremely likely. This collective action scale was
found to be reliable (α = .89) in this sample. Based on a principal components analysis, all items
loaded strongly onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 4.91). No other factors were retained.
Group Status Threat
Perceived threat produced by increasing diversity was measured via 4 items. These items
were adapted from Outten et al. (2012). An example item is: “My racial group should be
threatened by growing ethnic diversity in the US”. All items were on a 7-point scale ranging
from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7). The group status threat scale was found to have
poor reliability (α = .53) in this sample. However, based on a principal components analysis, all
items loaded onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 1.69). No other factors were retained. Since all items
loaded onto one factor and removing items would lower the internal reliability of the scale, all 4
items were included in the scale.
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Support for Restricting Voting Rights
A six-item measure of support for restricting voting rights was created for the purposes of
this experiment. The items were based on real-world policy and social issues surrounding voting
rights in the US. All items were rated on a 7-point likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly
agree). Response choices were reverse coded so that higher numbers meant more support for
restricting voting rights. The items were: “The government should make same-day voter
registration legal”, “The government should expand the number of voting locations in each US
county”, “All American US election ballots should be in English”, “If elected officials suspect
that the results of an election are fraudulent, they should have the authority to reject those
results”, “US citizens with past criminal convictions should be allowed to vote in US elections”,
and “The government should make it easier for US citizens in jail to vote in US elections.” The
support for expanding voting rights scale was found to be reliable (α = .73) in this sample. Based
on a principal components analysis, all items loaded onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.61). No
other factors were retained.
Exploratory Items
Participants also answered 1 item regarding their support for the Black Lives Matter
movement. The item was the same item as Experiment 1. Participants then answered 3 items
regarding their beliefs in minority collusion. The minority collusion items were the same items
as those in Experiment 1. Lastly, participants answered 3 items regarding rumination regarding
demographic change. The items were: “I keep thinking about how upset I feel about my racial
group being replaced by minorities.”, “I keep wishing that demographic change would end in the
U.S.”, and “I keep thinking about the negative consequences that increasing diversity in the U.S.
will have against Whites.” The last three items had a 7-point response format that ranged from 1
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(Strongly Agree) to 7 (Strongly Disagree), had high internal consistency (α = .92), and loaded
onto one factor (Eigenvalue = 2.57).
Demographics
Participants answered questions regarding their sex, age, race/ethnicity, income, how
urban/rural (1 = Very Urban, 7 = Very Rural) their community is, and the amount of
demographic change (1 = Not at all, 7 = Totally) happening in their community.
RESULTS
Primary Analyses
Manipulation Checks
General linear models were utilized to assess the manipulation checks. For the first
manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in the US are drastically
different from past patterns of demographic change.”), the findings demonstrated a significant
main effect, F(2, 337) = 29.64, p < .0001, ηp2 = .15. As expected, participants in the abrupt
demographic change condition reported significantly higher support for the belief that the
demographic change rate happening in the US was drastically different from past patterns of
demographic change (M = 5.36; SD = 1.34) compared to those who were in the continuous
demographic change (M = 3.86; SD = 1.73), F(1, 337) = 56.60, p < .0001, ηp2 = .14, and
Nintendo games conditions (M = 4.33; SD = 1.43), F(1, 337) = 29.04, p < .0001, ηp2 = .07.
Participants in the Nintendo games condition reported significantly higher support for the belief
that the current demographic change occurring in the US was drastically different than past
patterns of demographic change in comparison to those in the continuous demographic change
condition, F(1, 337) = 5.38, p < .0001, ηp2 = .01.
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For the second manipulation check (i.e., “The current demographic changes happening in
the US are consistent with past patterns of demographic change), there was a significant main
effect, F(2, 337) = 33.40, p < .0001, ηp2 = .16. The results demonstrated that participants in the
continuous demographic change condition reported significantly higher support for the belief
that the demographic change happening in the US was consistent with past patterns of
demographic change (M = 5.13; SD = 1.32) compared to those who were in the abrupt
demographic change (M = 3.52; SD = 1.69), F(1, 337) = 66.74, p < .0001, ηp2 = .16, and
Nintendo games (M = 4.27; SD = 1.43), F(1, 337) = 14.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .04, conditions.
Additionally, participants in the Nintendo games condition reported significantly higher support
for the belief that demographic change currently happening in the US is consistent with past
patterns of demographic change in comparison to those in the abrupt demographic change
condition, F(1, 337) = 18.22, p < .0001, ηp2 = .05.
Finally, there was not a significant main effect for the third manipulation check (i.e., “Do
you believe the White American population in the US to be:”. The response choices were 1
(Greatly increasing in the future) to 5 (Greatly decreasing in the future) after being reverse
coded), F(2, 337) = 1.74, p = .176, ηp2 = .01. Participants, regardless of condition had high
support for the belief that the White population would be decreasing greatly in the future (M =
3.69; SD = 1.02).
Analytical Approach
A stepwise regression analysis was conducted to test the effects of type of demographic
change on group status threat, violent radicalization, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders,
Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions. The analyses were
conducted via separate models. Abrupt demographic change was coded as 1, Nintendo games
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was coded as 2, and continuous demographic change was coded as 3. The moderators were
mean-centered. In step 1, condition, and national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) were entered
into the models. In step 2, condition, national nostalgia (or national prostalgia), and the condition
by national nostalgia (or national prostalgia) interaction were entered into the models. If the
results yielded a significant finding, in step 3, social political ideology was entered into the
model in addition to the aforementioned predictors (See figures 10 and 11 for an illustration of
the conceptual models). One standard deviation above the mean in national nostalgia and
prostalgia was conceptualized as high national nostalgia and prostalgia. All beta coefficients
corresponding to Experiment 2 are unstandardized. Correlations between all variables of interest
and means and standard deviations for each variable are reported in Table 5 below.

Figure 10: Conceptual Model Being Tested for the Interaction Between Condition and National
Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables.
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Figure 11. Conceptual Model Being Tested for the Interaction Between Condition and National
Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables.
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Table 5: Correlations Between all Variables of Interest for Experiment 2.
Variable

1

2

3

4

1. National Nostalgia

---

2. National Prostalgia

.44***

---

3. White Identity

.46***

.23***

---

4. Political Ideology

.44***

.17**

.40***

---

5. Group Status Threat

.38***

.08

.34***

.41***

---

6. Violent Radicalization

.45***

.28***

.40***

.37***

.42***

---

7. Right-Wing Leaders

.56***

.31***

.51***

.54***

.42***

.72***.

---

8. Donald Trump

.37***

.18**

.44***

68***

.40***

.42***

.60*** ---

9. Collective Action

.24***

.33***

.22***

.09

.10

.36***

.32*** 16**

10. Voting Restrictions

.31***

-.06

.42***

.55***

.48***

.30***

48*** .54*** -.03

---

M

3.78

3.50

4.96

4.32

2.89

3.18

3.59

3.47

3.49

3.72

SD
*p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001

1.47

1.47

1.21

2.02

0.72

1.34

1.55

2.25

1.42

1.20
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5

6

7

8

9

10

---

Effects with Demographic Change and National Nostalgia as Predictors
There were no significant main effects of condition predicting group status threat, t(337)
= -1.43, p = .153, violent radicalization, t(337) = -1.43, p = .860, support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, t(337) = -.16, p = .872, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(337) = -0.70, p
= .482, collective action for White nationalism, t(337) = -0.38, p = .706, or voting restrictions,
t(337) = -0.48, p = .630. Additionally, there were no significant interactions between condition
and national nostalgia for group status threat, t(336) = .22, p = .826, support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, t(337) = .07, p = .945, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(337)
= 1.02, p = .310, collective action, t(337) = 1.57, p = .081, or voting restrictions, t(337) = 0.46, p
= .646.
There was, however, a significant interaction between condition and national nostalgia
for violent radicalization (utilizing all 10 items), t(337) = 2.15, p = .032 (See Figure 12).
Contrary to what was predicted, those who were high in national nostalgia and who were in the
continuous demographic change condition reported significantly more violent radicalization in
comparison to those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change
condition, b = .58, t(333) = 2.539, p = .011. Additionally, those high in national nostalgia who
were in the continuous demographic change condition reported significantly higher violent
radicalization compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the Nintendo Games
condition, b = .65, t(333) = 2.426, p = .015. There was no difference in violent radicalization
between those high in national nostalgia who were in the abrupt demographic change condition
compared to those high in national nostalgia who were in the Nintendo Games condition, b =
.006, t(333) = .03, p = 980. The relationship between national nostalgia and violent radicalization
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was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the continuous demographic
change condition compared to all other conditions (See Figure 12 below).

Figure 12: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Violent Radicalization.
Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta coefficients of national nostalgia predicting violent
radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Next, the predicted effects were tested while adding social political ideology as a
covariate in the model. The findings demonstrated that there continued to be a significant
interaction between condition and national nostalgia, t(335) = 2.26, p = .024. Contrary to what
was predicted, those high in national nostalgia who were in the continuous demographic change
condition reported significantly higher violent radicalization in comparison to those in the abrupt
demographic change condition who were high in national nostalgia, b = .57, t(332) = 2.529, p =
.011. Like in Figure 12, the relationship between national nostalgia and violent radicalization
was significant in all conditions but was qualitatively larger in the continuous demographic
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change condition compared to all other conditions. Those effects are illustrated below in Figure
13.

Figure 13: Interaction Between Condition and National Nostalgia on Violent Radicalization
while Controlling for Social Political Ideology. Note: b’s correspond to unstandardized beta
coefficients of national nostalgia predicting violent radicalization by condition. *p ≤ .05. **p <
.01. ***p < .001.
Effects with Demographic Change and National Prostalgia as Predictors
There were no significant main effects of condition predicting group status threat, t(337)
= -1.78, p = .076, violent radicalization, t(337) = 0.65, p = .518, support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, t(337) = -1.05, p = .294, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(337) = -1.22,
p = .224, collective action, t(337) = -1.05, p = .296, or voting restrictions, t(337) = -0.67, p =
.505. Additionally, there were no significant interactions between condition and national
prostalgia predicting group status threat, t(336) = 0.04, p = .971, violent radicalization, t(336) =
1.10, p = .270, support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, t(336) = -0.26, p = .797, Donald
Trump’s 2024 presidency, t(336) = 0.93, p = .352, collective action, t(336) = 0.25, p = .800, or
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voting restrictions, t(336) = -0.67, p = .505. Since no significant effects were found, social
political ideology was not added as a covariate.
Mediation Analyses
To test the direct and indirect effects of the manipulation on support for right-wing
authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions
through group status threat and violent radicalization via separate models, model 6 from Hayes
(2012) PROCESS SPSS macro was used. The models utilized 5,000 bootstrapping resamples to
produce 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. The first set of analyses did not control for
social political ideology. If the analyses yielded a significant effect, a second set of analyses
controlling for social political ideology were run. The conceptual model is illustrated in Figure
14 below. The models (See table 6 for full results) where right-wing authoritarian leaders, F(3,
335) = 116.63, p < .0001, R2 = .51, support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(3, 335) =
31.62, p < .0001, R2 = .22, collective action, F(3, 334) = 26.66, p < .0001, R2 = .19, and voting
restrictions, F(3, 335) = 43.66, p < .0001, R2 = .28, were the outcome variables were significant.
However, there were no significant total, direct, or indirect effects.
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Figure 14: Conceptual Model Illustrating the Effect of Condition on the Dependent Variables
Through Group Status threat and Violent Radicalization
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Table 6. Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of Condition on the Dependent Variables through Group Status
Threat and Violent Radicalization.
Variable
Total Effect
Direct Effect
Indirect Effect
Indirect Effect
Indirect Effect (Through
(Condition on
(Through group (Through violent
group status threat and
dependent variables) status threat)
radicalization)
violent radicalization)
Right-Wing
Authoritarian Leaders

-.05 [-.26, .14]

-.08 [-.23, .06]

-.03 [-.08, .006]

.09 [-.03, .21]

-.04 [-.08, .008]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

-.14 [-.43, .15]

-.11 [-.37, .06]

-.07 [-.18, .01]

.06 [-.01, .14]

-.02 [-.06, .005]

Collective Action

-.05 [-.23, .13]

-.09 [-.26, .07]

.009 [-.01, .04]

.06 [-.02, .15]

-.02 [-.06, .007]

Voting Restrictions

-.07 [-.19, .05]

-.03 [-.13, .07]

-.04 [-.10, .02]

.01 [-.002, .03]

-.004 [-.01, .0008]

Note: Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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Post-hoc Analyses
Additional analyses were conducted to investigate whether the post-hoc findings from
Experiment 1 replicate. Thus, new analyses were conducted via SPSS process macro and had
similar specifications as those in previous mediation analyses. Model 6 was utilized (See Figure
15 and 16 for an illustration of the conceptual models). Social political ideology was added as a
covariate in the models. Additionally, condition was added as a covariate to account for any
effects of condition on the outcome measures. Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported
below.

Figure 15. Conceptual Model for the Effect of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables
through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.
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Figure 16. Conceptual Mediation Model for the Effect of National Prostalgia on the Dependent
Variables through Group Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.
Mediation Models with National Nostalgia as the Focal Predictor
The models (See Table 7 for full results) with support for right-wing authoritarian
leaders, F(5, 333) = 108.78, p < .0001, R2 = .62, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(5, 333) =
67.96, p < .0001, R2 = .50, collective Action, F(5, 332) = 16.90, p < .0001, R2 = .20, and voting
restrictions as the dependent variables were significant. All total effects were significant such
that national nostalgia predicted higher support for all the outcome variables. Additionally, there
was only one significant direct effect. The findings demonstrated that national nostalgia
predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders. There were two significant
indirect effects via group status threat, such that national nostalgia predicted increases in support
for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency and voting restrictions via increases in group status threat,
but not support for right-wing authoritarian leaders or collective action. There were several
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indirect effects via violent radicalization, such that national nostalgia predicted increases in
support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective
action via increases in violent radicalization, but not voting restrictions. Lastly, there were
several indirect effects via group status threat and violent radicalization, such that national
nostalgia predicted increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s
2024 presidency, and collective action via increases in group status threat and violent
radicalization, but not voting restrictions.
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Table 7: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Nostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group
Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.
Variable
Total Effect
Direct Effect
Indirect Effect Indirect Effect
Indirect Effect (Through
(National nostalgia on (Through group (Through violent
group status threat and
dependent variables)
status threat)
radicalization)
violent radicalization)
Right-Wing
Authoritarian Leaders

.42 [.33, .52]

.21 [.13, .30]

.02 [-.007, .04]

.17 [.10, .25]

.02 [.008, .04]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

.13 [.00, .26]

.01 [-.13, .15]

.04 [.001, .08]

.07 [.02, .14]

.01 [.002, .02]

Collective Action

.25 [.14, .36]

.11 [-.005, .22]

-.02 [-.05, .02]

.14 [.08, .21]

.02 [.007, .04]

Voting Restrictions

.09 [.03, .15]

.03 [-.03, .09]

.05 [.02, .08]

.005 [-.02, .03]

.0007 [-.003, .004]

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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Mediation Models with National Prostalgia as the Focal Predictor
The model (See Table 8 for full results) with support for right-wing authoritarian
leadership, F(5, 333) = 98.34, p < .0001, R2 = .59, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, F(5, 333) =
68.08, p < .0001, R2 = .50, collective action, F(5, 332) = 20.44, p < .0001, R2 = .23, and voting
restrictions as the dependent variables were significant. The findings demonstrated that there
were significant total effects, such that national prostalgia predicted higher support for rightwing authoritarian leaders and collective action, and less support for voting restrictions.
Additionally, there were significant direct effects, such that national prostalgia predicted
increases in collective action and less support for voting restrictions. There were no significant
indirect effects of national prostalgia on the outcome variables via group status threat. There
were several significant indirect effects via violent radicalization such that national prostalgia
predicted higher support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency,
and collective action via increases in violent radicalization, but not voting restrictions. Lastly,
there were no significant indirect effects of national prostalgia on the outcome variables via
group status threat and violent radicalization.
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Table 8: Total, Direct, and Indirect Effects for Mediation Models of National Prostalgia on the Dependent Variables through Group
Status Threat and Violent Radicalization.
Variable
Total Effect
Direct Effect (National Indirect Effect
Indirect Effect
Indirect Effect (Through
prostalgia on
(Through group
(Through violent
group status threat and
dependent variables)
status threat)
radicalization)
violent radicalization)
Right-Wing
Authoritarian Leaders

.23 [.14, .33]

.07 [-008, .15]

.002 [-.009, .02]

.16 [.09, .23]

.003 [-.01, .01]

Donald Trump’s 2024
Presidency

.10 [-.02, .22]

.04 [-.09, .16]

.002 [-.02, .02]

.06 [.02, .12]

.001 [-.006, .007]

Collective Action

.32 [.22, .42]

.21 [.11, .31]

-.0007 [-.01, .008]

.11 [.06, .17]

.002 [-.009, .01]

Voting Restrictions

-.06 [-.11, -.002]

-.08 [-.13, -.02]

.004 [-.02, .03]

.01 [-.005, .03]

.0002 [-.002, .002]

Note: Models control for condition and social political ideology. Brackets contain 95% confidence intervals.
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DISCUSSION
The findings from Experiment 2 were mixed. While there were no significant main
effects and the majority of the predicted interactions were nonsignificant, there was a significant
interaction between the experimental manipulations and national nostalgia on violent
radicalization. Contrary to what was predicted, those high in national nostalgia who believed that
the demographic change in the US was continuous reported significantly higher violent
radicalization. These findings are not consistent with other findings that have investigated
continuous demographic and cultural change (Armenta et al., 2022). Additionally, there were
several indirect effects of national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome variables through
increases in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. Generally, the indirect effects of
national nostalgia and prostalgia on the outcome measures via increases in violent radicalization
were larger than any of the other indirect effects. The national nostalgia indirect effects, but not
the national prostalgia indirect effects are consistent with previous research (Armenta et al.,
2022; Reyna et al., 2022). The findings from Experiment 2 will be further discussed in the
general discussion.
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Chapter 4: General Discussion
The CIM posits that individuals and groups attempt to remain at rest (i.e., static cultures
want to maintain cultural and demographic stability). When external forces challenge cultural
and demographic stability (i.e., individuals or groups introduce cultural and/or demographic
change), the residents of those static cultures fight back against those impending changes in
order to maintain their status quo (Zárate et al, 2012; Zárate et al, 2019). However, not much
research has investigated the methods through which individuals and groups push back against
demographic change. To fill this gap in the literature, the purpose of the current experiments was
to apply the CIM in order to: 1) identify methods through which majority groups attempt to
maintain the status quo as a function of demographic change, 2) identify who is more likely to
support those methods, 3) identify solutions for reducing those methods, and 4) identify
explanations for those relationships.
In Experiment 1, it was first predicted that White participants who were presented with
information suggesting that the current demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos
was abrupt would report significantly higher support for violent radicalization, right-wing
authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White
nationalism. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to investigate solutions for reducing those
negative reactions. Experiment 2 also had similar predictions, however, in Experiment 2 it was
predicted that presenting demographic change as continuous would reduce group status threat,
support for violent radicalization, right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency, collective action, and voting restrictions. The predictions were not supported. Across
both experiments and all conditions, participants were equally likely to support the outcome
measures.
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The null main effects in Experiments 1 and 2 are inconsistent with the CIM and what has
been found in the literature. For example, research demonstrates that in the face of cultural and
demographic change, individuals are more likely to support conservative policies that limit
immigration (Armenta et al., 2022; Craig & Richeson, 2014; Zárate et al., 2012), react with
heightened prejudice and derogation toward those who are believed to be enacting cultural and
demographic change (Armenta et al., 2022), report more group status threat (Craig & Richeson,
2014; Major et al., 2016), and are more likely to support radical leaders such as Donald Trump
(Major et al., 2016). It has also been theorized that increasing diversity (e.g., increases in
foreign-born and US-born Latinos) often helps democratic US candidates win elections (Hill et
al., 2019; American Progress, 2020). Thus, conservatives across the US are making it more
difficult for individuals, especially racial/ethnic minorities to vote (Brennan Center for Justice,
2022). Experiment 2’s findings regarding support for voting restrictions are inconsistent with the
aforementioned literature. Experiment 2’s findings are also inconsistent with other work
regarding framing demographic and cultural change as continuous (Armenta et al., 2022).
One explanation for the null effects might be that the manipulations were successful in
making participants believe that 1) the demographic change in the US was a function of foreignborn Latinos (in Experiment 1) or US-born Latinos (in Experiment 1) and 2) the demographic
change in the US was abrupt (in Experiment 2) or continuous (in Experiment 2). However, in
general, the manipulations were not successful in making those in the experimental conditions
believe that the White population would be significantly decreasing in the future more so
compared to the control conditions. Ideally, participants who received the experimental
manipulations would be reporting stronger support for the belief that the White population is
decreasing in the future compared to those in the control conditions. This is problematic because
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if demographic change is theorized to incite extreme and negative reactions, but the
manipulations are not inciting observable differences (compared to control conditions) in the
belief that demographic change is occurring, then it makes logical sense why overall there were
no observable differences in the outcome variables. Given that the findings are inconsistent with
CIM, the findings could mean that the CIM needs to be revisited and should make the case that
not all societal shifts that are theorized to challenge the self-concept incite extreme reactions.
Prior research, for example, has demonstrated that people react more negatively toward cultural
change in comparison to cultural stability, even when demographic change is made salient in
both conditions (Armenta et al., 2022). Thus, perceived cultural change might be inciting
hostility, not demographic change. However, more research should be conducted before that is
concluded.
The main effects of demographic change found in the literature are often qualified by
individual difference measures. In the context of the CIM, individual difference measures that
exacerbate or reduce negative reactions toward cultural and demographic change are respectively
termed psychological anchors (e.g., national nostalgia) and propellors (e.g., national prostalgia).
Recently, there has been increased attention in collective nostalgia and collective nostalgia’s
various forms. National nostalgia has been linked to higher negative attitudes toward immigrants
(Armenta et al., 2022; Smeekes et al., 2014) and lower support for social movements and the
creation of new social norms (Armenta et al., 2021). Similarly, racial nostalgia has been linked to
increased support for harsh anti-immigrant policies and White nationalism (Reyna et al., 2022).
Thus, focusing on the past, leads to intergroup hostility in the present. In contrast, focusing on
the future may benefit the present. Research demonstrates that those higher in national prostalgia
report higher support for the BLM movement, the creation of new social norms, and lower
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negative attitudes toward immigrants (Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al., 2022). Thus, the
second prediction was that national nostalgia would interact with the experimental
manipulations, such that those high in national nostalgia and national prostalgia would
respectively report increased and reduced support for the outcome variables when demographic
change is presented as abrupt.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANCHORS
National Nostalgia
The findings were mixed. Despite being positively correlated with the outcome measures,
national nostalgia (in Experiments 1 and 2) did not interact with the manipulations to produce
differences in group status threat (in Experiment 2) or support for right-wing authoritarian
leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency (in Experiment 2), collective action for White
nationalism, or voting restrictions (in Experiment 2). It was true, however, that in Experiment 1
those higher in national nostalgia who believed that abrupt demographic change was produced
by foreign-born Latinos reported higher ideological radicalization compared to those who were
in the no-narrative condition. Additionally, higher support for Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency
was reported when highly nostalgic White individuals believed that abrupt demographic change
was being produced by foreign-born Latinos in comparison to those high in nostalgia who
believed that abrupt demographic change was being introduced by US-born Latinos. The
significant interactions from Experiment 1 disappeared after including social political ideology
as a covariate in the models. Contrary to what was predicted, Experiment 2 demonstrated that
framing demographic change as continuous produced more violent radicalization among those
high in national nostalgia compared to when demographic change was framed as abrupt and
compared to those who were in the Nintendo games condition. The effects in Experiment 2 were
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relatively robust, such that they remained significant even after including social political
ideology as a covariate. Given that social political ideology was driving the effects in
Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2, more research should be conducted to determine which
variable (national nostalgia or social political ideology) is a better predictor of intergroup
hostility.
Additionally, ideological radicalization did not explain the significant interaction findings
mentioned in Experiment 1, and in contrast to what was predicted, there were no significant
effects of the condition on the outcome variables through increases in group status threat and/or
violent radicalization. There were, however, several significant post-hoc findings. Independent of
social political ideology and the experimental manipulations, across both experiments, increases
in national nostalgia predicted higher support for right-wing authoritarian leaders, Donald
Trump’s 2024 presidency, collective action, and restricting voting rights through increases in
group status threat (in Experiment 2) and/or violent radicalization.
These findings are consistent and somewhat inconsistent with what has been found in the
literature. Research demonstrates that collective nostalgia facilitates social connectedness with
individuals with whom one shares common memories, cultures, and experiences (Brown &
Humphreys, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2016). According to the discontinuity hypothesis, collective
nostalgia allows individuals to gain a sense of self-continuity (i.e., one’s past self is consistent
with one’s present and future self) during periods of disruption that challenge one’s identity (e.g.,
cultural, and demographic change; Sedikides et al., 2016). In other words, experiencing
collective nostalgia offers benefits at the interpersonal and intragroup level (Brown &
Humphreys, 2002; Sedikides et al., 2016). However, as has been noted above and consistent with
the CIM, national nostalgia exacerbates ideological and violent radicalization in the face of
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demographic change, especially if the demographic change is framed as continuous and if the
demographic change is being produced by foreign-born Latinos. Broadly, the findings from
Experiment 1 may suggest that demographic changes produced by outside forces may produce
more negative reactions than changes produced by inside forces. Though, more research will
need to be conducted to support that hypothesis.
The national nostalgia findings extend findings in the literature by showcasing, for the
first time, that those higher in national nostalgia are more likely to support actual physical
violence against those who are believed to be enacting demographic change. However, given that
social political ideology was driving ideological radicalization in Experiment 1 (but not driving
violent radicalization in Experiment 2), more research should be conducted in order to replicate
the effects. What remains unclear was why framing demographic change as continuous
exacerbated violent radicalization in those high in national nostalgia. This is in contrast with
previous literature that demonstrated that framing demographic change as continuous lead to less
fear, ingroup protection motives, outgroup derogation motives, and collective angst (Armenta et
al., 2022) and higher polycultural ideology (Aguilera, 2022). However, this is consistent with
unpublished research from Aguilera (2022) where they find that those who were high in national
nostalgia and believed that the demographic change occurring in the US was continuous reported
less support for liberal policy positions such as changing the US constitution. Thus, it seems as if
the average person is benefiting from framing demographic and cultural change as continuous,
but it is exacerbating negative reactions from those high in national nostalgia.
An explanation for why those high in national nostalgia are reacting more negatively
toward continuous demographic change may be that it is challenging their view on how the US
used to be. Research on toxic forms of collective nostalgia (e.g., racial nostalgia) argues that one
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reason for why collective nostalgia leads to intergroup hostility is that it facilitates an idealized
world view of a monolithic US (presumably an entirely White US; Reyna et al., 2022). By
presenting the demographic landscape in the US as continuous, this might suggest to those high
in national nostalgia that the safe and prosperous US that they idealize may have never actually
existed and may never exist. What is the result of being challenged? Violent radicalization.
Additionally, across both experiments and independent of social political ideology and
the manipulations, national nostalgia predicted increases in the outcome variables via increases
in group status threat and/or violent radicalization. These findings are consistent with what the
National Institute of Justice (2015) reports on risk factors for violent radicalization (i.e., feelings
of threat leading to violent radicalization). However, these findings extend the findings from the
National Institute of Justice by demonstrating that high national nostalgia may also be a risk
factor for violent radicalization, especially since the beta coefficients of the indirect effects of
national nostalgia on the outcome measures via violent radicalization were qualitatively larger
and consistently significant compared to the other indirect effects. In addition, these findings
suggest that those high in national nostalgia may be supporting right-wing authoritarian leaders,
including Donald Trump, and collective action for White nationalism, in order to make the
present US more like their idealized version of the US’s past. Lastly, these findings demonstrate
that violent radicalization does not only lead to physical intergroup violence, support for violent
radicalization also leads to support for radical hostility that systematically targets racial/ethnic
minorities.
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROPELLORS
National Prostalgia
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The CIM posits that there are individual difference measures that facilitate one’s
acceptance of change (i.e., psychological propellors such as national prostalgia; Armenta et al.,
2021; Zárate et al, 2019). Thus, national prostalgia was predicted to lead to reduced support for
the outcome variables in the face of demographic change. However, unlike the national nostalgia
findings, national prostalgia did not interact with the manipulations in any of the models. This
was somewhat surprising since there is a growing body of research that demonstrates that
national prostalgia predicted higher support for agents of change (Armenta et al., 2021; Armenta
et al., 2019). Given that national prostalgia produced consistently smaller correlations with the
outcome measures compared to national nostalgia, it could be the case that the study was not
sufficiently powered to detect the interaction between condition and national prostalgia.
What was most surprising was that national prostalgia was positively correlated with
increases in violent radicalization (in Experiment 2) and support for right-wing authoritarian
leaders, Donald Trump’s 2024 presidency, and collective action for White nationalism. This is
inconsistent with has been reported by research regarding national prostalgia (Armenta et al.,
2021; Armenta et al., 2019). Additionally, whereas national nostalgia is consistently correlated
with social political ideology (i.e., in Experiment 1 and 2 and other research; Armenta et al.,
2021; Armenta et al., 2022), national prostalgia is not typically correlated with social political
ideology (though it was positively correlated with social political ideology in Experiment 2;
Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al., 2021).
Previous research on national prostalgia has primarily used liberal samples (e.g., college
students, White liberal samples from Amazon Mturk; Armenta et al., 2019; Armenta et al.,
2021). However, in the current experiments, national prostalgia was investigated utilizing two
primarily White conservative samples. If national prostalgia isn’t correlated with social political
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ideology, it could be that conservatives and liberals are both reporting similar levels of national
prostalgia, but the future they envision is different which, in turn, is driving the direction of the
correlations.
In line with the correlational findings, post-hoc analyses demonstrated that independent
of social political ideology and the experimental manipulations, national prostalgia indirectly
lead to increases in support for right-wing authoritarian leadership, Donald Trump’s 2024
presidency, and collective action for White nationalism via increases in violent radicalization
(Experiments 1 and 2). The findings for national prostalgia on the outcome variables via group
status threat were nonsignificant. Though, this could have been due to group status threat having
poor internal reliability.
While not consistent with other research investigating national prostalgia (Armenta et al.,
2021), these findings may be consistent with other research regarding future-orientation.
Research demonstrates that future thinking is linked to motivation and goal planning, which may
also influence subsequent behavior (Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Robbins & Bryan, 2004; Nurmi,
2005; Rothspan & Read, 1996). Thus, it is possible that while those high in national nostalgia
want to return back to their idealized version of the past, those who are high in national
prostalgia are preparing and organizing to achieve an idealized version of the future. And violent
radicalization may be the primary driving force that in turn leads to intergroup hostility.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS/LIMITATIONS
It would behoove future researchers to conceptually replicate the results in these
experiments for various reasons. First, the experimental manipulations did not produce
observable differences in the belief that the White population would be decreasing the future. For
future studies, scientists should either produce stronger demographic change experimental
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manipulations and/or identify more appropriate control conditions. Second, the significant
findings in Experiment 1 were no longer significant after controlling for social political ideology.
While this is consistent with previous research regarding national nostalgia (Armenta et al.,
2021), other studies have found that national nostalgia and racial nostalgia effects continue to be
significant even after controlling for social political ideology (Lammers & Baldwin, 2018; Reyna
et al., 2022). Thus, it is important for future studies to conceptually replicate the findings in order
to determine whether presenting demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as
abrupt produces higher ideological/violent radicalization and support for Donald Trump. Third,
future research should replicate the collective action for White nationalism findings utilizing a
similar measure as the one administered in Experiment 1. Since the collective action measure
was changed in Experiment 2 and was significantly more subtle, it is possible that the collective
action being reported in Experiment 2 is different than the collective action being measured in
Experiment 1 (despite similar findings being reported).
Fourth, future studies should investigate the relationship between national nostalgia and
prostalgia on the outcome measures via violent radicalization in an apiori fashion and
experimentally manipulate national nostalgia and prostalgia to determine whether those variables
cause increases in the outcome variables. Like in previous research (Reyna et al., 2022), it might
be useful to use writing tasks to manipulate national nostalgia and prostalgia so that the content
of what the participants are writing about can be further analyzed. Through this type of design,
researchers may be able to observe what exact versions of the past and future those high in
national nostalgia and prostalgia are thinking about. Fifth, if demographic change leads to violent
radicalization among those high in national nostalgia, then it is important to investigate possible
methods for deradicalization.
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Lastly, an additional future direction may be to study additional methods that majority
groups attempt to maintain the status quo. One method of maintaining the status quo may be
participating directly in careers designed to maintain social stability. For example, research
demonstrates that students with high anti-egalitarian attitudes are more likely to choose
hierarchy-enhancing careers such as being involved in the criminal justice system (Sidanius et
al., 2003), presumably as a way to actively maintain social hierarchies in the US (i.e., White
individuals at the top of the hierarchy and racial/ethnic minorities at the bottom of the hierarchy).
Similarly, in the face of demographic change, nationally nostalgic White individuals may
actively seek roles where they can control the amount of cultural and demographic change
occurring, such as joining the Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
IMPLICATIONS
In addition to the implications already mentioned, the findings from the current
experiments suggest that the way in which information is presented could be fueling the political
division in the US and abroad. Thus, political campaigns, news outlets, leaders, etc. need to be
careful of the messages they disseminate and who they are disseminating it to. The latest US
capitol riot, which led to one person being killed, for example, is argued to have been incited by
misinformation propagated by President Donald Trump (Kydd, 2021). The findings from the
current experiment suggest that Mr. Trump’s rhetoric may have violently radicalized his
supporters, motivated the political violence during the storming of the US capitol, and may have
caused several other displays of White nationalism (Arango et al., 2019; Gamboa, 2019;
McEldowney, 2018; Robertson et al., 2018). If messages propagated by authority figures are
causing radicalization, then policies should be enacted to prevent messages that violently
radicalize individuals from reaching fastidious populations such as those high in national
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nostalgia – and there should be swift legal and social consequences for those who purposely
choose to violently radicalize the masses with their messaging.
CONCLUSION
As the US becomes increasingly diverse, it is important for social scientists to investigate
the negative consequences of increasing diversity on intergroup relations. Additionally, it is
important for social scientists to study how to reduce those negative consequences. Thus, the
purpose of the current experiments was to apply the CIM to study how majority groups attempt
to maintain the status quo and solutions for reducing those negative reactions. The findings
demonstrated that framing demographic change produced by foreign-born Latinos as abrupt or
continuous produced significantly more ideological/violent radicalization among those high in
national nostalgia. These findings are telling, given that the US has some of the highest levels of
national nostalgia around the world (IPSOS, 2020). For future studies, it is important to study
how to successfully reduce violent radicalization in the face of inevitable demographic change in
order to facilitate intergroup peace.
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APPENDIX A: MODERATORS (EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2)
National Nostalgia
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you think about the following questions.
According to the Oxford Dictionary, “nostalgia” is defined as a “sentimental longing for the
past.”
1 = Not

2=A

at all

Little

3 = Sometimes

4=A

5 = A 6 = A 7 = Very

Moderate

Lot

Good Much
Deal

1. How often do you bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way the United States
was in the past?
2. How important is it for you to bring to mind nostalgic experiences related to the way the
United States was in the past?
3. How significant is it for you to feel nostalgic about the way the United States was in the past?
4. The way Americans were in the past.
5. The way American society was in the past.
6. The way the American landscape (i.e. surroundings) looked like in the past.
National Prostalgia
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you think about the following questions.
According to our definition, prostalgia is defined as "a sentimental longing for a future."
1 = Not

2=A

at all

Little

3 = Sometimes

4=A

5 = A 6 = A 7 = Very

Moderate

Lot

Good Much
Deal
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1. How often do you bring to mind possible prostalgic experiences related to the way the United
States will be in the future?
2. How important is it for you to bring to mind possible prostalgic experiences related to the
way the United States will be in the future?
3. How significant is it for you to feel prostalgic about the way the United States will be in the
future?
4. The way Americans will be in the future.
5. The way American society will be in the future.
6. The way the American landscape (i.e. surroundings) will look like in the future.
White Identity Scale
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
1 = Strongly agree
2 = Agree
3 = Somewhat
4 = Neither agree nor disagree
5 = Somewhat disagree
6 = Disagree
7 = Strongly disagree
1. I feel good about my racial background. (Reverse coded)
2. I feel a strong attachment towards my own racial group.
3. I have a lot of pride in my racial group. (Reverse coded)
4. I am happy that I am a member of the racial group I belong to.
Social Political Ideology
101

Instructions: Here is a 7-point scale on which the social views that people might hold are
arranged from extremely socially liberal (left) to extremely socially conservative (right). Where
would you place yourself on this scale?
1 = Very liberal
2 = Moderately liberal
3 = Slightly liberal
4 = Neither liberal nor conservative
5 = Slightly conservative
6 = Moderately conservative
7 = Very Conservative

102

APPENDIX B: MANIPULATIONS
Experiment 1 Manipulations
Foreign-Born Slides
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US-Born Slides
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108

109
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Experiment 2 Manipulations
Continuous Demographic Change Slides:
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Nintendo Games Slides
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APPENDIX C: OUTCOME VARIABLES
Manipulation Checks (Experiment 1)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1. The current demographic changes happening in the US are mostly due to increases in Latinos
born and raised outside (i.e., foreign-born Latinos) the US.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

2. The current demographic changes happening in the US are due to increases in Latinos born
and raised inside (i.e., US-born Latinos) the US.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

3. Do you believe the White American population in the U.S. to be: (Reverse coded)
1 = Greatly

2 = Slightly

3=

4 = Slightly

5 = Greatly

decreasing

decreasing

staying

increasing

increasing

in the future

in the future

the same

in the future

in the future

Manipulation Checks for Experiment 2
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Agree

Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1. The current demographics changes happening in the US are drastically different from past
patterns of demographic change.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

2. The current demographic changes happening in the US are consistent with past patterns of
demographic change.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

3. Do you believe the White American population in the U.S. to be:
1 = Greatly

2 = Slightly

3=

4 = Slightly

5 = Greatly

decreasing

decreasing

staying

increasing

increasing

in the future

in the future

the same

in the future

in the future

Group Status Threat
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
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1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

1. My racial group should be threatened by growing ethnic diversity.
2. My racial group will benefit from increasing diversity in the U.S.
3. How much influence will ethnic minorities have over the U.S. in the future?
4. How much influence will White Americans have over the U.S. in the future?
Violent Radicalization (Experiments 1 and 2)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7

=Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

1. Those groups in the society that do not support the good and correct life should be deprived
of their rights.
2. It is a waste of time to try to find common solutions with those whose thoughts about life are
completely different than ours.
3. It is wrong to make compromises with what oneself stands for.
4. It is wrong and immoral to live peacefully side by side with people who do not live the good
and correct life.
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5. In the end, there must be a confrontation – one cannot forever live peacefully, side by side
with people who live a completely different life than they are obligated to live.
6. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating
proper conditions for those with whom one feels a solidarity.
7. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating a
new and better society.
8. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating
proper conditions for those one is closely connected to.
9. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of creating
respect for one’s own rights and security.
10. Using physical violence is the only thing that really works when it is a matter of preventing
repression and assault of my people.
Right-Wing Authoritarian Leadership Support (Experiments 1 and 2)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to destroy
the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
2. The majority of those who criticize proper authorities in government and religion only create
useless doubts in people’s mind.
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3. The situation in our country is getting so serious, the strongest method would be justified if
they eliminated the troublemakers and got us back to our true path.
4. What our country really needs instead of more ‘‘civil rights’’ is a good stiff dose of law and
order.
5. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn.
6. What our country needs most is disciplined citizens, following national leaders in unity.
7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our traditional
values, put some tough leader in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas.
8. Once our government leaders give us the ‘‘go ahead,’’ it will be the duty of every patriotic
citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within.
Collective Action for White Nationalism (Experiment 1)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1

=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

1. I am supportive of organizations/groups that bring attention to White concerns.
2. I support public protests where concerns regarding Whites in the US being replaced by an
influx of racial/ethnic minority groups are discussed.
3. I support public protests where concerns regarding Jews controlling the American economy
are discussed.
4. Whites should take to the streets to protest demographic changes happening in America.
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5. Whites should band together as a collective to garner support for policies that ensure a White
majority.
Collective Action (Experiment 2)
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you would be willing to engage in different
types of action to challenge discrimination toward people of your racial group. Please be honest.
The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will not be able to trace your
responses back to you.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Extremely

Moderately

Slightly

Likely nor

Slightly

Moderately

Extremely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Likely

Likely

1. Act as a spokesperson on the issue.
2. Spend time working for a fundraiser.
3. Attend meetings or workshops.
4. Raise issues in groups or organizations.
5. Attend demonstrations, protests, rallies.
6. Contact media to express my opinion.
7. Sign an online or written petition.
8. Contact an elected official.
9. Help organize a rally or demonstration.
Donald Trump’s 2024 Presidency (Experiments 1 and 2)
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Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1. If Donald Trump runs for president in 2024, I intend to fully support him.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

2. How likely are you to vote for Donald Trump in 2024?
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Extremely

Moderately

Slightly

Likely nor

Slightly

Moderately

Extremely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Likely

Likely

3. How warm do you feel toward Donald Trump?
1=

2=

3=

4=

5=

6=

Not at all

A Little

Slightly

Moderately

Considerably A lot

7=
Very much so

4. How much do you like Donald Trump?
1=

2=

3=

4=

5=

6=

7=

Dislike a

Dislike a

Dislike a

Neither like

Like a

Like a

Like a

Great deal

moderate

little

nor dislike

little

moderate great deal

amount

amount

Voting Restrictions (Experiments 2)
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Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

1. The government should make same-day voter registration legal. (Reverse coded)
2. The government should expand the number of voting locations in each US county. (Reverse
coded)
3. All American US election ballots should be in English. (Reverse coded)
4.

If elected officials suspect that the results of an election are fraudulent, they should have the
authority to reject those results. (Reverse coded)

5. US citizens with past criminal convictions should be allowed to vote in US elections.
(Reverse coded)
6. The government should make it easier for US citizens in jail to vote in US elections.
(Reverse coded)
Exploratory Items (Experiment 1)
Instructions: To what degree do you oppose or support the following social and political
movements in the U.S.?
1. Support for Alternative Right movement.
1

=

Strongly
Oppose

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

Oppose

Somewhat

Oppose nor

Somewhat Support

Strongly

Oppose

Support

Support

Support
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6=

7=

2. Support for Black Lives Matter movement.
2

=

Strongly

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

Oppose

Somewhat

Oppose nor

Somewhat Support

Strongly

Oppose

Support

Support

Support

Oppose

6=

7=

3. Minorities may disagree about some things, but one thing they agree on is that they don’t like
White people.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

4. Despite their differences, different minority groups regard White people as a common
enemy.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

5. Different minority groups are willing to cooperate with each other in order to take power
away from White people.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Exploratory Items (Experiment 2)
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Agree

Instructions: To what degree do you oppose or support the following social and political
movements in the U.S.?
1. Support for Black Lives Matter movement.
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
2. Minorities may disagree about some things, but one thing they agree on is that they don’t like
White people.
3. Despite their differences, different minority groups regard White people as a common
enemy.
Instructions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Please be honest. The surveys are completely confidential, and the researchers will
not be able to trace your responses back to you.
4. Different minority groups are willing to cooperate with each other in order to take power
away from White people.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

5. I keep thinking about how upset I feel about my racial group being replaced by minorities.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

6. I keep wishing that demographic change would end in the U.S.
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Agree

1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree

Agree

7. I keep thinking about the negative consequences that increasing diversity in the U.S. will
have against Whites.
1=

2=

3=

4 = Neither

5=

6=

7=

Strongly

Disagree

Somewhat

Agree nor

Somewhat

Agree

Strongly

Disagree

Disagree

Agree

Disagree
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Agree

APPENDIX D: DEMOGRAPHICS (EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2)
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about yourself.
1. What is your biological sex?
1 = Male

2 = Female

3 = Prefer not to say

2. How old are you?
3. What is your gender identity?
1 = Man

2 = man

3 = Non-binary/third gender

4 = Transgender

5 = Other

6 = Prefer
not to say

4. What is your race/ethnicity (Select all that apply)?
1 = White

2 = Black

3 = American

4 =Asian 5 = Native 6 = Latino 7 = Other

5. How would you describe the city or town you live in?
1= Very

2 = Urban

Urban

3 = Somewhat 4 = Not Urban 5 =Somewhat 6 = Rural

7 = Very

Urban

Rural

or Rural

Rural

6. How would you describe your political party preference?
1=

Strong Democrat

2 =

Not Strong Democrat

3=

Independent, Lean Democrat

4=

Independent

5=

Independent, Lean Republican

6=

Not Strong Republican

7=

Strong Republican

8=

other (specify)_____________________

7. How much demographic change do you think is happening in your local community?
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1 = Not at all 2 = A Little

3 = A moderate amount
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5 = A lot

6 =Very much
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